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I. Introduction 
In the Federal Governrnent's fiscal 1954 year, research and 
development programs within the Department of Defense (a) approxi-
mated 2 billion dollars in original expenditure budgets, (b) consisted 
of more than 6000 different projects, (c) utilized about 50 percent of 
the research resources of the nation and (d) employed in this Depart-
ment a total of nearly 114,000 persons. It is estimated that Government 
expenditures on research and development programs for defense in 
current fiscal 1955 will total about the same amount. Such activity 
obviously is business not on a big but on a gigantic scale. 
This statistical expression of the priority placed on research 
and development related to national security by our Government under-
scores the fact that we are presently in the midst of a world-wide 
11 technical revolution in warfare. 11 * The results of this revolution, 
as measured by research accomplishments in the atomic, physical, 
chemical and electronic sciences may mean the difference between 
victory or annihilation in any future conflict. All present indications 
are that this research struggle basically represents a long -term effort 
with no appreciable diminishing in scope envisioned in the near future. 
The same statistics emphasize the magnitude of the national 
investment in Government research and development and logically 
present for consideration a question which is receiving increasing 
*14, pp. 27-35 
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attention from Congress, the military, and general citizenry. The 
problem, with which we seem destined to wrestle for some time to 
come, is: how do we conduct business of this magnitude, involving so 
intangible a product, in a fashion which will make certain we are receiv-
ing full value for our dollar? Congressman Mahon of Texas perhaps 
expressed this worry rather bluntly when he remarked in the House of 
Representatives Hearings on t:te Department of Defense 1954 Appropri-
ation that 11 There has sprung up a feeling in this country, and to some 
degree in the Congress, that we are wasting a lot of money in the field 
of research and development and that we could get just as much national 
defense by spending, say, $1 billion less per year on research and 
development than we are spending. 11 * 
The method of determination and expenditure of the Depart-
ment of Defense research and development budget with all its attendant 
military, economic, and political considerations is obviously a topic 
far beyond the limitations of a paper of this type and no attempt will be 
made by the author to discuss this subject. In an effort to isolate for 
examination, however, one very pertinent aspect of this broad current 
issue, the thesis does concern itself with the problem of determining, 
contracting, providing and utilizing effectively the funds required to 
conduct Government research and development contracts with private 
industrial and institutional organizations. Since, in the aggregate, 
more than three -fourths of all military research and development 
requirements are fulfilled through these sources, it is hoped that, by 
*19, p.l71 
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considering these problems as they relate primarily to the individual 
contractor and secondarily to the Federal Government, certain conclu-
sions may be reached regarding financial management principles and 
procedures which might eliminate difficulties in the field of research 
and development. 
The treatment of the subject logically divides itself into two 
distinct but interlocking parts. The first section considers the problems 
involved in the financial organization and management of the program 
by the contractor and cognizant Government agency; the second discusses 
the operating and administrative procedures necessary to prosecute the 
program to a successful conclusion within the established financial 
limitation. While the second phase of the problem could possibly be 
defined as an operating rather than financial management question, it 
must be recognized that maximum effectiveness of financial manage-
ment can be achieved only when it is fully integrated into the over-all 
management picture. 
For expression of the contractor's viewpoint, the thesis will 
draw heavily on case information derived from the operating experience 
of a major electronics company conducting extensive research and 
development programs for the Department of Defense. Information 
will come from three general sources: company internal records and 
correspondence, interviews and discussions with company officials, 
and on-the-job observations by the author. This data is supplemented 
by various business books and technical articles. Because of the con-
fidential nature of the information involved, illustrative contract titles 
and details have been disguised. 
9 
For expression of the Government viewpoint, the thesis will 
rely on published Government regulations and bulletins, hearings before 
Congressional committees, company correspondence with Government 
agencies, and personal interviews with Government technical and con-
tractual personnel. 
Dealing as this paper does with certain financial and manage-
ment questions of an unresolved nature in a highly dynamic research 
and development period, some of the conclusions expressed by the 
author may be subject to dispute because of differences in basic assump-
tions or principles. Every effort has been made, however, to distin-
guish between opinion and fact and the writer accepts full responsibility 
for the contents of the thesis. 
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II. The Nature of Government Research and Development 
A. Purpose and Function 
"Prior to World War II, Federal Government sponsorship 
of scientific activities was confined largely to the conduct of scientific 
research and development in Government owned installations. 
11 World War II altered this pattern. Modern war uses scien-
tific knowledge as insatiably as it does material resources. It was not 
enough for the Government under the press of the modern war emer • 
gency to enlarge its own capacity for scientific research and develop-
ment. It had necessarily to seek out scientific talent and resources 
wherever these might exist or could be assembled. Industrial concerns 
supplied much of the needed effort, especially the technological knowl-
edge required to develop and produce the complex machinery of modern 
warfare. ' 1 * 
This is the design which emerged from the war. Since then 
it has grown more and more evident that our national safety is now 
inextricably linked to our technological progress. The conclusion 
appears inescapable that the United States, as long as present world-
wide tensions exist, is committed to an intensive national research 
and developmental program intended to maintain military superiority. 
This is the basic purpose and function of the Government activity to be 
discussed in this paper. Government research and development funds 
*15, p.v 
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today are primarily (over 90 percent) allocated to projects directly or 
indirectly related to national security and the term "Government 
research and development" as used hereafter by the author is meant 
to denote Government sponsored research and development having mil-
itary applications. 
B. Methods of Accomplishment 
This work can be carried out in Government laboratories, 
Government subsidized research centers, private organizations, uni-
versities, or non-profit institutions. 
The distribution of research and development between so-
called 11 in house 11 programs conducted in Government laboratories and 
non-Government "service" contracts has, since World War II, steadily 
increased in favor of outside contracted research. The chief reason 
for this shift is undoubtedly due to the fact that the tremendous post-
war expansion in this field of activity has, almost from the start, pre-
eluded significant direct Government participation because of the lack 
of available technical personnel. In addition, basic Government phi~ 
losophy has consistently favored the usage of private facilities to ~)er­
form these tasks. Some of the presumptive advantages which have 
prompted the military to rely increasingly on this method of fulfilling 
their needs are: organizational flexibility, freedom from governmental 
procedural rigidities, and greater ease in recruiting and compensating 
scientific personnel. 
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An activity representing almost a compromise between those 
two systems is the research center. This is essentially a Government 
laboratory run by a private organization under a contractual arrange-
ment. Examples of this type of operation are the Brookhaven Laboratory, 
the Oak Ridge Laboratory, and the John Hopkins Applied Physics 
Laboratory. The prime difference between these organizations and 
industrial concerns is that there exists a continued collaboration between 
the Government and the research center wherein the Government deter-
mines the general objectives and provides operating funds while the 
contractor supplies the managerial services. 
At present more than three quarters of all military research 
and development requirements are being fulfilled through service con-
tracts. Indications are that the percentage will remain at this level 
or even a higher one as witness the conclusions of the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Government Operations on this subject: 11 The 
testimony and the statements from many scientists, science adminis-
trators and administrators of military research activities indicate that 
the major part of research and development work with the exception of 
operational suitability testing, should be performed by service contracts 
with industry, universities and non-profit corporations especially 
designed to conduct research and development programs. 11 * 
The tremendous increase in over -all post-war Government 
research work has, in fact, taxed the ability of the Defense Department 
to provide an adequate staff of technical personnel qualified to monitor 
*20,. p.50 
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and judge the merits and potentialities of all the various programs under 
support, many of which are fiercely competitive in claims of predicted 
and actual success. This problem will be discussed in more detail in 
the chapter on Government - Contractor Liaison. 
14 
Til. Contractual Aspects of Government Research & Development 
Having determined that the great share of Government 
research and development work is being and will continue to be con-
ducted by non-military sources, the question arises: how are these 
sources selected and what are the contractual instruments used to 
effect this effort? 
The passage of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 
1947# opened the way for the modern procurement methods now utilized 
by the military forces. The basic policies and procedures governing 
all types of Armed Forces procurement under this act are defined in 
a publication called the Armed Services Procurement Regulations 
(ASPR). This document specifies the practices to be followed in all 
types of military contractual arrangements, including those for research 
and development work. 
A. Methods of Procurement 
The time honored Government formal advertised "open bid" 
procurement method, with ultimate contract award to the lowest respon-
sible bidder, is limited by its very nature to requirements of a reason-
ably standard commercial category which can be adequately defined by 
specification. The largest portion of formal advertised procurement 
# Pub. Law No. 413, 80th Gong., Zd Sess. 
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today is made by the Quartermaster Corps in connection with commonly 
used items of this type. 
A very substantial portion of present Armed Services pro-
curement requirements are being fulfilled by negotiated contracts. The 
increasing reliance on this type procurerrent is a by-product of World 
War II which has the advantage of enabling the procuring military depart-
ment to adopt the type of purchasing agreement most suitable for the 
particular conditions involved. It enables the Services to consider on 
an individual basis the facilities, know-how, financial status, efficiency 
and risks of each contractor. 
In the case of research and development contracts, it is 
readily apparent that the formal advertised system is not usable. 
Problems of military security, lack of definitive specifications covering 
the desired items, and the limited number of sources having experience 
in the "state of the art" make negotiation the only practicable basis of 
contract award. In addition, 11 Talent capable of undertaking scientific 
research and the engineering of new weapons cannot be secured by 
public advertisement and sealed bids. Since confidence in the ingenuity 
and know-how of particular individuals will be the overriding considera-
tion in such procurement, administrative discretion in the selection of 
the contractor is imperative. 11 * 
The procedure generally followed in the awarding of negoti-
ated contracts is described thus in a Government manual issued for the 
information of industry: 
*4, p. 31 
As a basis for negotiation, the purchasing office 
will invite qualified sources of supply to submit 
quotations and may, in some cases, request that 
they be accompanied by estimated production costs. 
Suppliers whose proposals are low enough to be 
considered may be contacted, at which time the 
purchasing office will endeavor to secure the best 
possible contract, taking into account quality, 
delivery, price, business reputations, and other 
factors. By their nature, negotiated contracts 
often require individual tailoring to fit the cir-
cumstances involved in each instance.*'' 
B .. Method of Contractor Selection and Award 
16 
The selection of a contractor to conduct a research and 
developmental program is based upon an evaluation of several factors. 
The technical proposal is, of course, the prime consideration in judging 
the bid. Since in many, perhaps most, of the Government request for 
bids on research and development work, the equipment design objective 
is the only piece of information furnished which approaches a specifica-
tion, as many technical avenues of approach can be received as there 
are bidders. Estimated prices are at this stage unimportant since 
first consideration must be given to the probability of success which 
may be expected to be achieved, using the assumptions and recommen-
dations received from various contractors. These decisions require 
detailed study by technical authorities. In some cases the technical 
assumptions may be reduced to mathematical formulas and the proba-
bilities of success plotted statistically. 
*18, p. 5 
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Having narrowed the selection down to a few sources whose 
technical proposals appear to promise the highest potential degree of 
success, other factors are measured. Estimated program cost is, of 
course, an important element of the proposal since the project must be 
integrated into the involved agency's over-all budget. However, in a 
research and development bid, the Government must also consider the 
reasonableness of the quoted price from the standpoint of the probable 
ability of the bidder to meet fully the program objectives. In many 
cases, a comparison is possible by Government reference to the devel-
opment cost of related equipments procured for other applications from 
other companies. There is always the suspicion that a bidder submit-
ting a significantly lower bid than his competition does not really under-
stand the full implications of the problem. In that case, the net result 
would be a considerable waste of vital time, a lack of an essential 
piece of military equipment, and an almost total loss of any public 
funds paid out to the contractor. For this reason, the Armed Services 
place considerable stress on the company historical research and 
development record, the experience of key company engineering per-
sonnel who will be used on the project, and company held pertinent 
associated Government contracts. In addition to this type of informa-
tion, the cognizant Government agency usually seeks data on the finan-
cial stability and responsibility of the bidding organization. This may 
take the form of a request for the latest company balance sheets and 
profit and loss schedules, together with statements of Government 
and commercial order backlogs and their rate of monthly liquidation. 
18 
Also, although the cost-plus -fixed-fee (CPFF) contract 
generally used in industrial research and development work permanently 
limits the maximum fee reimbursable under the contract, final actual 
allowable costs are payable in full even though they may be far in excess 
of the original estimated cost. Thus, a low CPFF proposal does not 
guarantee that the final program cost will be within the original bid 
total. This point is discussed in greater detail in the chapter on Financial 
Problems of Research and Development. 
Delivery schedules are another influencing aspect of the 
research and development proposal. Time is all important in research 
and development - an eXperimental product may be worth a great deal 
if delivered within one year, almost nothing if delivered in two years. 
The estimated bid cost must be measured against probable competitive 
delivery schedule advantages which may outweigh even significant price 
differentials. A simple unit capable of delivery in one year may tip the 
contract award against a more advanced product which will not be ready 
for two and one-half years. 
After consideration of all the previously discussed items, 
one or more experimental approaches are selected and the sponsoring 
industrial organizations contacted for negotiation of definitive contract 
arrangements. 
If immediate commencement of work is essential, a letter 
of intent can be awarded to the chosen concern to enable the company 
to begin operations with the assurance that all incurred allowable costs 
will be paid. 
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C. Contractual Instrument Form 
The cost-plus-fixed-fee contract has, through necessity, 
become the standard instrument for performance of major industrial 
research and development work. Despite considerable criticism of its 
use by Congress and the public, no other contractual form yet devised 
meets as well the demands imposed by the peculiar nature of this activ-
ity. The CPFF contract provides for payment to the contractor of the 
total allowable costs established in the contract plus a fixed fee based 
on the original estimated cost of the contract. Although actual costs 
may vary from the estimate, the fee remains constant. 
The reasons for using CPFF contracts are several. First, 
the unpredictability of the costs required to design and develop an equip-
ment capable of meeting the performance objectives set forth in most 
large Government research and development proposal requests makes 
any experienced research organization refuse to bid on any basis other 
than cost-plus -fixed-fee. The lack of related past cost data and the 
uncertainty or complete lack of specifications make any appraisal of 
total program cost a "best guess" estimate. Secondly, the design 
problem represented by the program desired results may prove to be 
beyond present technological capabilities. Under a fixed price arrange-
ment, the Government incurs no cost liability since the contractual 
agreement has not been met. Under CPFF terms, if the contractor 
has exerted his "best efforts" to meet the contract requirement, he is 
entitled to recover his costs. Another consideration involves the size 
of the proposed contract in relation to the contractor's capital investment. 
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In some instances, particularly the aircraft and guided missile fields, 
the total value of active contracts may exceed the company capital 
investment. An error in negotiating a fixed price development contract 
under these conditions could force the contractor into bankruptcy. 
Because of these factors, the great majority of large scale 
research and development performed by industry is done under the 
CPFF structure. 
A certain amount of research and development work is done 
under various types of fixed price contracts. They are used in cases 
where the required work does not possess all of the unforeseeable 
characteristics of CPFF research. Usually, while such a contract 
specifies a predetermined price, provisions are included for price 
redetermination due to unpredictable changes in cost factors. 
21 
IV. Financial Problems of Research and Development 
The financial problems connected with research and develop-
ment work often becpme painfully apparent to the industrial contractor 
long before he signs the formal contract. These fiscal difficulties con-
tinue to appear in various forms throughout the entire program. This 
chapter will discuss s orne of the more typical problems. 
A. Contractor Reimbursement Problems 
1. Letters of Intent 
Frequently, the contractor's first official notification of 
success in his bid for a Government research and development contract 
of any significant scope comes with the arrival of a letter of intent 
from the cognizant military agency. This document states that the 
agency intends to award the concern a contract (generally CPFF) to 
carry out the research and development program outlined in the com-
pany's technical proposal to meet the objectives of the Government 
request for bid. The letter of intent (or letter contract as it is also 
termed) is a temporary contractual instrument containing a description 
of the articles to be furnished, but usually no prices or firm delivery 
schedule. It is issued in order to give the contractor a binding commit-
ment which will permit him to proceed immediately with the work pend-
ing negotiation and preparation of definitive terms. It also authorizes 
him t6 incur costs up to a limit stated in the letter. 
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The letter of intent serves a very useful purpose ih enabling 
the successful bidder to get work started quickly after the decision to 
award the contract to his concern has been made. It is, however, a 
document whose use, from both the company and Government standpoint, 
should be restricted to a brief period. The key to effective utilization 
of the letter of intent as a financial aid in research and development 
lies almost entirely in its prompt conversion to a formal contract. 
The reasons for this are many. First, it represents a 
"start-work" mechanism only with little or none of the definitive terms 
worked out. The position of the industrial contractor in the event of 
work cancellation while a program is in the letter of intent stage is 
always a delicate contractual problem. Secondly, the letter of intent 
places important financial restrictions on the amount of progress a 
development program can achieve. The compensation provisions of 
the letter define both the maximum cost which may be incurred and the 
percentage of progress work payments which the responsible Government 
Auditing Agency is allowed to pay. As befitting a temporary instrument, 
the maximum cost limitation is usually established as a relatively sma.ll 
percentage of the estimated final contract value. Each time this maxi-
mum is reached, work must stop until a formal amendment to the letter 
of intent, increasing the maximum cost limitation, is obtained from the 
program contracting officer. The percentage of progress payments 
which may be made against a letter of intent generally varies from 
75 percent to 90 percent of the incurred costs. No fee is collectible 
under a letter of intent. These restrictions mean that the company 
holding the letter of intent in addition to collecting no profit, must 
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actually finance 10 to 25 percent of the work during the entire period 
of contract negotiation. The amount of money tied up in unbillable 
inventory costs under such an arrangement may rapidly become a 
critical issue to a company which does not have an unusually strong 
working capital position. 
The Services are aware of this problem and are following a 
policy of liquidating as rapidly as possible these work authorization 
documents. The U.S. Air Force in its discussion of 1954 procurement 
considerations lists as one of its prime objectives the ability to "cut 
down, e~iminate as much as possible, the number of letter contracts, 
or temporary deals that delay final negotiation with contractors. 11 * 
However, immediate success in this attempt is not always 
possible. In some cases, delay over contract items such as delivery 
schedules, Government Furnished Equipment, special allowable costs, 
and applicable specifications may prevent the letter of intent from 
being converted into a contract for as long as two years. Indiscriminate 
use of the letter of intent can create many problems for both contractual 
parties. To the Government, this document represents in some respects 
a "blank check" authorizing the contractor to spend money on labor, 
materials and facilities without establishment of a specified deliverable 
product, mutually satisfactory contract terms, or even assurance that 
a contract can be negotiated. From the contractor's standpoint, it 
represents a risk of a termination without notice, resulting perhaps 
in the disruption of an organization geared to a specialized program 
*12, p.lOl 
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and the expenditure of considerable managerial time, engineering effort, 
working capital and plant facilities without any profit; indeed, perhaps 
not even full recovery of incurred costs if interest charges on borrowed 
working capital are involved. 
The use of the letter of intent in a research and development 
program is generally necessary in situations where a certain amount 
of preliminary work has to be done to determine exactly what the con-
tract objectives will be or where additional experimental study time is 
required to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the over-all cost of the 
technical development program. An example of a contractor's proposal 
illustrating this point is as follows: 
The extended scope of the program and the limited 
time available to prepare this proposal make it 
suitable only for a letter of intent award. The 
Contractor reserves the right to enter into the final 
contract only on the basis of a more accurate and 
detailed proposal to be submitted at a later date. 
Where sufficient contractual, cost, and technical data exist to negotiate 
a firm contract directly from the original proposal this should be always 
done in preference to use of the letter contract. In recent periods, as 
a result of efforts in this direction within the various military depart-
ments, the use of the letter of intent has declined noticeably in favor of 
the formal contract. 
Z. Contract Reimbursement Procedure 
a. Cost Reimbursement Contracts 
The great majority of research and development work, as 
previously pointed out, is performed under some type of cost 
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reimbursement contract. The 11 Compensation Provisions 11 of this 
type document define the exact manner of cost recovery, together 
with a summary of allowable direct cost and overhead items. Usually, 
the contractor renders to the cognizant Government Audit Agency peri-
odic invoices (generally monthly) covering total incurred costs for the 
report interval. Original copies of all invoices paid by the contractor, 
original stores requisitions covering all material drawn from company 
stores, and Payroll Department labor cost schedules are furnished in 
substantiation of the prime charges listed in the invoice. Overhead 
burdens are generally applied to the prime charges in accordance with 
standard rates negotiated periodically between the Government and 
contractor on the basis of past company experience. Some companies 
prefer to use an actual overhead rate determined retroactively after 
close of the fiscal period. For billing purposes, in these cases, an 
estimated overhead rate would be employed. The contractor's pro-rata 
share of the total contract fixed fee, applicable to the costs being sub-
mitted for reimbursement, is included in the invoice in the manner 
designated in the contract. A typical reimbursement clause reads: 
Installment payments not exceeding in the aggregate 
ninety percent (90%) of the fixed fee shall be made 
to the Contractor at the time of each provisional 
payment on account of Allowable Cost. The amount 
of each installment payment shall be in the same 
ratio of ninety percent (90o/o) of the fixed fee as the 
related provisional payment on account of Allowable 
Cost is to the total estimated cost of performance 
of this contract. Upon final acceptance of all 
supplies and services to be furnished by the Con-
tractor hereunder, the unpaid balance of the fixed 
fee shall be paid to the Contractor, subject to any 
adjustments of the fixed fee in accordance with 
other provisions of this contract. 
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Other fee payment arrangements include Government payment of fixed 
percentages of the total fee on specific dates correlated to the over-all 
program time schedule, i.e., 20 percent of the fee in October 195-, 
20 percent in January 195-. Although the detail involved in furnishing 
original record support of every bolt, nut, and screw used in the pro-
gram during the report month is a major bookkeeping problem, the 
prompt cost recovery possible on a CPFF contract fully executed and 
financed represents a highly desirable feature to the research contractor. 
b. Fixed Price Contracts 
While the overwhelming bulk of significant research and 
development work is carried on under the CPFF structure, occasionally 
development contracts are awarded on a fixed price basis. These con-
tracts are generally not of a basic research nature but involve, rather, 
the redesign or modification of an existing equipment or the fabrication 
of a limited 11 model shop" quantity of experimental units based on a 
prototype already in existence. Since Armed Services fixed-price 
orders provide for payment of invoices only upon shipment and accep~ 
tance of deliverable units, a contractor faces the prospect of having 
large sums of money frozen in non-billable inventory costs over prac-
tically the entire life of the development contract. To avoid this situ-
ation, which would create an undue financial burden on the contractors 
involved, certain Armed Services contracts include partial {or progress) 
payment clauses. This clause is the compensation arrangement without 
27 
which it would be impossible for the normal industrial contractor to 
conduct any large scale Government fixed price research. 
c. Partial Payment Clauses 
Partial payment clauses generally provide that 
the contractor will submit periodic invoices 
{usually monthly), indicating the total costs 
incurred under the contracts in that period. 
Payment is then made to the extent of 75% of 
such costs, or to the extent of 90o/o of direct 
material and direct labor costs only, and when 
shipments are made, a proportionate amount 
of the partial payments are liquidated against 
the amounts due. The contract will generally 
provide 'that in no event shall the total of 
unliquidated partial payments exceed 80% of 
the contract price of supplies still to be 
delivered.'* 
Since direct labor is the major cost item in research and development 
work, progress payment on the basis of 75 percent of total costs repre-
sents the more advantageous payment method from the standpoint of 
the average industrial contractor. This is due to the fact that this 
procedure allows recovery of overhead costs on the expended direct 
labor. 
Where major unpredictable cost factors in the development 
work are involved, provisions may be made in the fixed price contract 
agreement for redetermining the price in the event of unforeseen and 
unavoidable cost changes. 
*7, p.49 
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3. Installment Contracts 
The installment type of cost-plus -fixed-fee contract is being 
increasingly used in major research and development work because of 
the manner in which the various branches of the Defense Department 
are attempting to finance their program requirements. Each one of 
the Defense Departments receives its over -all research and development 
budget via annual military appropriations from Congress. This money 
is used to support all of the departmental research and development 
activities for the current fiscal year. Many of the scheduled programs 
are long range in character, however, and require funding commit-
ments in excess of a single year. It therefore becomes necessary to 
finance the main projects of each Department on an annual "pay-as-
you-go" basis with frequent use of the installment contract .. The 
alternative is to face the prospect of ending a fiscal year with large 
balances of "obligated" but unspent research and development funds. 
Although three years are legally allowed for the full expenditure of a 
given year's appropriations, a large balance makes it difficult, in prac-
tice, to secure new Congressional appropriations larger than those 
recorded as spent in the previous fiscal year. Hence, the recent 
trend toward long range program financing on the installment 
plan. 
Under this system, the face value of the contract specifies 
the full estimated amount of the program. However, each year, actual 
appropriations are made available by the cognizant agency for one year's 
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budgeted effort on the part of the contractor. Occasionally, an overlap 
of one quarter's fund is provided for contingencies and as a program 
reserve during the interval in which new fiscal year funds are being 
released by Congress. 
This type of program operation poses several problems in 
financing. The basis for the Government allocation of annual funds is 
primarily the contractor's record of expenditures in the recently com-
pleted year. Where the contractor's effort is running on a level plane, 
this procedure is satisfactory for budgetary purposes. If, however, 
as is more likely to be the case, the program research and development 
spending cycle resembles a curve peaking to a maximum point in the 
middle, adjustments have to be made to historical expenditure rate 
information to provide for this trend. If this factor is not taken into 
account when budgeting annual agency appropriations, the contractor 
will, in all probability, find his annual installment allotment totally 
inadequate for the financial support of the project at its most critical 
maximum effort point. Occurrence of this event will require a tempo-
rary slow-down of the program, extremely expensive due to personnel 
and facility re-allocation, or continued effort on the part of the contrac-
tor without temporary official financial coverage, relying on the good 
faith of the cognizant Government agency to make available enough 
additional funds from its "unobligated" appropriations to cover the 
hiatus. The annual installment rather than the contract face value 
becomes, for all practical purposes, the working maximum and progress 
and development effort are limited by this figure. It can be readily 
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seen that extremely close Government - Contractor financial planning 
liaison is necessary in this type contract to avoid serious crises. An 
additional problem which the contractor faces in the multiple year 
research and development installment contract is the Congressional 
mood with regard to military budgets. An "across the board" appro-
priations slash by an economy minded Congress can play havoc with a 
research and development contract carefuEy budgeted through two or 
three fiscal years. 
4. Contracts with Lapsed Appropriations 
Annual Government research and development appropriations 
normally bear the legal restriction that the funds provided thereby 
must be spent in full. within three years from the beginning of the fiscal 
year appropriation date, at which time the appropriation authorization 
"lapses." Payment of claims resulting from expenditure of lapsed 
appropriation funds cannot be authorized through the normal reimburse-
ment channel of the cognizant Government Audit Agency but must be 
forwarded for approval to the General Accounting Office. This is an 
accounting organization completely independent of the executive branch 
of the Government which reports to Congress, through the Comptroller 
General, on all expenditures made by the executive departments, includ-
ing the Department of Defense. It also conducts selective audits of 
payments made to companies on Department of Defense contracts, thus 
reviewing both contract award and reimbursement procedures. 
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The fact that reimbursement claims involving lapsed appro-
priations result in a delay of many months before payment is received 
from the Treasury Department after GAO approval understandably 
makes the industrial contractor extremely reluctant to use this course. 
On the other hand, however, a typical research and development con-
tract specifies many deliverable items other than the actual physical 
equipment "hardware;" Many of these items, such as final reports, 
operating handbook instructions, tables of recommended spare parts, 
and sets of manufacturing drawings are necessarily deliverable only 
after final equipment construction and check out. Not infrequently, 
therefore, work on these non-engineering documentary requirements 
stretches beyond the three year appropriation limitation. To avoid the 
prospect of having costs on these items held up for several months in 
GAO audit and review procedures before reimbursement there is a very 
strong temptation for the average company to spend heavily funds due 
to lapse soon without full regard for the question whether or not the 
equipment design is sufficiently 11 frozen" and prototype performance 
sufficiently satisfactory to justify major cost commitments on these 
technical literature and drawing requirements. Again, in the case of 
a contract covered by two annual appropriations, it is easily predictable 
which appropriation will be arbitrarily charged for the major share of 
work, deserved or not, as one allotment begins to approach its June 30 
(end of Government fiscal year) deadline. There is, therefore, an 
open question whether this rule is of any real value to either the 
Government or the contractor and also whether the best interests of 
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either are being served by attempting to financially constrict research 
and development effort within a predetermined time limit. 
5. Phased Contracts 
The phased contract resembles the installment contract in 
that it constitutes an attempt by the procuring military agency to finance 
a major research and development contract on a "pay as you go" basis. 
The mechanics employed to attain this objective are somewhat different, 
however. Under the "phasing" approach a major experimental pro-
gram is broken down into a series of steps or phases. A separate 
contract is made and financed each year for one or more phases of 
the over-all major problem. 
A representative series of phases could run as follows: 
Phase I - Feasibility Study; Phase II -Prototype Model; Phase III -
Developmental Equipment; Phase N - Pre-production Equipment. A 
contract for each new phase is of course, dependent upon successful 
completion of the preceding phase. A typical contract clause covering 
the period of performance for a given phase is as follows: 
Work to commence 1 July 195- and end 30 June 195-. 
It is contemplated that this project may not be com-
pleted within the time agreed in this contract; there-
fore, it is the intention of the parties to extend the 
work called for herein for such period as may be 
agreed upon with or without additional consideration. 
If at the completion of the above Phase I tasks the 
Government requests further negotiations with the 
Contractor for Phase II tasks, the Contractor agrees 
to conduct such negotiations. 
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This type of contract approach, where its use is feasible, 
is considered preferable to the installment contract because of the 
smaller financial commitment incurred by the Government at any one 
time. However, in many types of electronic development work, phases 
become very interdependent and extremely difficult to separate from 
the point of view of time and work content. The phased contract also 
has the disadvantage of representing a 11 series 11 approach to the pro-
gram in comparison to the 11 parallel" possibilities contained in the 
installment contract. Because of these reasons, phased contracts in 
electronic research and development work are not commonly adopted. 
6. Anticipatory Cost Clauses 
A step which most industrial concerns take rather reluctantly 
as a method of research and development work financing involves the 
use of a contract anticipatory cost clause. The reluctance with which 
a contractor utilizes this form of financing stems from a recognition 
of the fact that it is not actually a Government guarantee of cost recov-
ery. The Government, during preliminary negotiations for a research 
and development contract or letter of intent, may, at the contractor's 
request, agree to insert into the formal work authorization document 
a clause permitting the contractor to bill the Government for costs up 
to a stipulated maximum incurred in the prosecution of the program 
objectives in anticipation of receipt of a formal Government contract 
commitment. The flaw in this type of arrangement, from the bidder's 
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viewpoint, is that in the event the Government should decide to award 
the contract to another concern or discard the project completely, the 
expenditure outlay on the contract bidder's part becomes a non-recover-
able expense. The Government contracting officer's position in such 
an event is quite clear - 11 The contractor is under no obligation to start 
work until receipt of contract. 11 While this statement is technically 
correct, dependence upon this philosophy as a practical method of 
operation presents several problems. 
Quite often in the electronics industry, research and develop-
ment is conducted by a contractor for the Government on a program 
rather than project basis. This type of arrangement tends to occur 
where an industrial organization achieves developmental success in 
a specialized area of electronic activity. The unique technical position 
of the contractor and the highly specialized techniques used in contract 
performance necessarily render him the basic source for any subse-
quent research work supplementing the scope of the original contract. 
If this were not done, much duplication of research effort and costs 
would inevitably result, making the over-all national research and 
development program much more expensive to the Government. Under 
these conditions, over a period of time, the concern involved can find 
itself conducting a series of Government developmental contracts all 
stemming from a common base and all constituting contributary effort 
towards an ultimate goal. Since all the work objectives represent 
different applications or modifications of the successfully demonstrated 
basic principle, the over -all company developmental activity becomes 
fundamentally concerned with achievements on a program level rather 
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than on an individual contract basis. Where work which can materially 
affect the results of such an integrated program is concerned the 
responsible contractor feels a definite obligation to take appropriate 
technical action at the right time, whether or not there is a firm con-
tract in the house covering the particular development task under 
negotiation. 
In such a case, the contractor may feel it advisable from an 
over-all viewpoint to begin the next stage of program development on 
the strength of informal Government assurance of an impending contract 
covering the desired new scope and containing an anticipatory cost 
clause. This procedure again, assuming all contract negotiations are 
successfully culminated, necessitates the company holding all anticipa-
tory costs in an unbillable work in process account until signing of the 
formal document. 
Another situation which may require the bidder's resorting 
to this contract clause is in the case of "long lead" items. Often 
critical materials or components must be ordered several months in 
advance of requirements because of 1ong fabrication or delivery periods. 
Lack of a key electronic component of comparative small dollar value, 
may delay a high priced project team for several weeks. By use of an 
anticipatory cost clause, orders for these "long lead" items may be 
placed at an earlier date than would be otherwise possible. Also, in 
certain research and development effort, all work may center about the 
solution to one key critical problem. Initiation of early study on this 
"gaiting" factor may reduce later costs by an amount far beyond the 
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original financial outlay because of the later savings to be realized in 
complementary work scheduling. Here also a development contractor 
may start work immediately on the basis of an anticipatory cost clause. 
B. Contractor Additional Financing Problems 
1. Overrun 
The problem of overruns appears to be an occupational 
hazard of the industrial concern engaged in Government research and 
development work today. As previously mentioned, the inability of 
any party, either in Government or industry, to forecast with any degree 
of accuracy, the final cost of a development equipment never before 
conceived and capable of performance never before achieved makes a 
cost reimbursement contract for this type of work mandatory. The 
estimated cost bid submitted by a contractor for a major research and 
development project actually represents then his best "order of mag-
nitude" appraisal of the complexity of the problems to be overcome, 
modified perhaps by a somewhat more reliable estimate of the amount 
of money which the cognizant military agency has available to spend 
on such a task. 
Under these circumstances, the frequent discovery of the 
fact that, after a lengthy period of experimentation on the contractor's 
part, the money originally appropriated for the contract is on the verge 
of depletion while many engineering problems have yet to be solved 
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comes as no great surprise to either the Government or the contractor. 
This condition may be created by one or more of several factors: 
a. While the technical problems involved in the project 
were considered thoroughly in the proposal, the financial requirements 
necessary to overcome these obstacles were not fully realized. 
b. Research and development discoveries in the performance 
of the work have necessitated fundamental changes in the original 
design concept. A representative contractor overrun request letter 
revolving about this problem begins simply 11 During the performance 
of the ... contract, it has suddenly become evident that the design of 
the ... unit will require considerably more engineering effort than 
was contemplated at the start of the development. 11 Changes in equip-
ment design are always expensive and change seems to be almost 
synonymous with development effort. 
c. The program cost was deliberately understated by the 
award winning bidder in an effort to break into a new field of activity 
considered sufficiently promising to influence him to perform the work 
at a low fee. 
d. Factors outside the contractor's control have consumed 
funds budgeted for other purposes. Delay in Government Furnished 
Equipment, subcontractor component delivery, program schedules, 
non-predictable material and labor cost rises all influence the over-all 
contract cost. All these items will be discussed in greater detail in 
following chapters on contract bidding and work budgeting principles. 
From the knowledge of experience, the Government normally 
sets aside a percentage of its annual research and development 
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appropriations to cover overruns and writes into all applicable contracts 
a "limitation of allowable cost" clause which states: 
If at any time the Contractor has reason to believe 
that the cost to be incurred by it in the performance 
of this contract in the next succeeding 60 days, when 
added to all previous costs, will exceed the total 
estimated cost of performance, as revised from time 
to time in accordance with the provisions herein, the 
Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer to 
that effect, giving a new estimate of the total expen-
ditures required to perform this contract together 
with an appropriate breakdown of such estimate and 
a statement setting forth the reasons for such antic-
ipated increase in cost, so that at the discretion of 
the Contracting Officer an appropriate increase may 
be made in the estimated cost without increase in 
the fixed fee. 
It should be noted that this clause provides for increase in 
estimated cost only. The fee, as its description states, remains 
fixed as a percentage of the original contract cost. An overrun thus 
reduces the contractor's fee percentage from that originally negotiated 
to a new percentage based on the ratio of the original fee to the new 
total cost. From a profit standpoint this is a highly undesirable situ-
ation, since it necessitates the contractor tieing up his entire facilities 
and organization, which might otherwise be employed in a profit making 
operation, for an additional period of time at no fee. 
Having approached the point of maximum cost limitation, 
the contractor must sit down and make a new evaluation of the total 
estimated project cost. At this juncture, the contractor should be on 
much firmer cost estimating ground than he was at the time of the 
original bid. Most of the project design work is completed and he is 
well aware of the specific problems remaining to be solved in the 
creation of a successful prototype unit. His overrun proposal is usually 
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a fairly realistic appraisal of the state of the work, although, such is 
the nature of development that a last minute component failure in test 
may dictate an extensive equipment design change, 
Following agreement among the operating technical staff on 
the amount of the required overrun, the company Contract or Technical 
Sales Department inherits the problem of 11 selling" this additional 
financing proposal to the cognizant Government agency, The responsible 
contracting officer in the agency has the authority to approve or disap-
prove this request. If progress to the point of fund exhaustion has 
justified technical expectation or if the equipment represents a military 
top priority necessity, prompt approval will probably be forthcoming 
from the contracting officer. This does not necessarily mean that 
funds will be forthcoming immediately, however, for it now becomes 
the task of the Financial Section to make available out of appropriation 
reserves the requested money. In an economy year when a reduction 
in 11 current funds available for obligation" is being experienced, this 
becomes a difficult and often protracted assignment. 
Conversely, if project technical progress has lagged, a 
competitor achieved success using other techniques, progress in the 
electronic 11 state of the art" made the equipment being designed of 
secondary importance, the contracting officer will not be especially 
anxious to support further work. In this event, the contract may be 
terminated at its present point of completion with the contractor 
delivering to the Government all work in process. Based on a 
Government-Contractor negotiated percentage of work completion 
estimate, the contractor's original fee will be proportionately adjusted. 
40 
An alternate method sometimes employed to finance research 
and development programs to completion without actually supplying any 
more money involves the deletion or reduction of contract item require-
ments by a dollar amount sufficient to cover the anticipated overrun. 
Under this system which is aimed at enabling the Government to receive 
and evaluate a completed developmental equipment at no over-all addi-
tional contract cost, 11 non-hardware" items such as spare parts, man-
ufacturing drawings and formal handbooks of operation may be deleted 
to permit use of these earmarked funds for engineering purposes. 
For these reasons, the overrun, though typifying no novelty 
in research and development work, does create financial issues which 
must be resolved by the contractor. There is first the problem of 
securing the contracting official's approval for the overrun. This 
obstacle surmounted, he must pry loose from the cognizant agency 
sufficient unobligated funds to cover his requirement. Thirdly, he 
faces the unenviable prospect of a reduced profit margin on the contract. 
Last but by no means least, he recognizes the fact that even if he has 
managed to estimate the magnitude of an impending overrun and notify 
the cognizant Technical Service within the required 60 day notification 
period, a distinct possibility exists that the additional funding will not 
clear through channels and reach his company before he has achieved 
the limit of contract financial coverage. If so, he again must decide 
whether to continue operations without formal legal protection or tem-
porarily stop the project in protection of the company interest at the 
price of a delivery time delay, disorganization of the research staff, 
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and an increase in the eventual project cost. The choice almost appears 
to be one of a "heads you win, tails I lose" nature. 
2. New Scope 
The questions raised by the necessity for contract modifica-
tions or increase due to new scope resemble in many ways those 
created by overrun situations. The two additional financing methods 
differ principally in the important aspect of profit treatment. Since 
new scope in research and development may be broadly defined as an 
increase in contract work content beyond that contemplated by the two 
parties in the original agreement, it logically follows that the contrac-
tor is entitled to claim both cost reimbursement and fee at the agreed 
upon rate for the additional involved work. 
The intangible and often unpredictable nature of research 
and development effort precludes the settlement of all the technical 
details of the work in advance. Frequently important discoveries in 
the field of study necessitate extensive changes in a contract, both in 
its technical provisions and financial terms. In many of these cases, 
there is no clear cut line of demarcation between work performance 
which is the contractor's original contract responsibility and that 
which is new responsibility created by a desired project technical 
change of direction. Since this issue involves profit or the lack of it 
on what may be an extensive project it is not surprising to find an 
industrial contractor protesting occasionally that the sponsoring agency 
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"has to date shown unwillingness to accept as new scope items which 
were definitely not within our concept of the original scope." Settle-
ment of this type of disagreement is normally accomplished by negoti-
ation between the contractor's personnel and representatives of the 
cognizant agency's technical and contracting staff. Here again, relative 
bargaining power is determined to a large degree by the over-all effec-
tiveness of the contractor's efforts to date. 
In addition to new scope created by technical changes in 
contract direction or objective, constantly shifting military require-
ments often result in contract modifications requested by the sponsoring 
Government agency. Such requests may take the form of orders for 
additional developmental equipment units, special equipment adaptations, 
field service requirements, etc. For administrative convenience, these 
supplementary requirements are frequently treated as amendments, 
or new scope, to existing contracts. 
The definition of annual project tasks, schedules, and financ-
ing arrangements under installment and phase contracts is also usually 
made through the medium of an amendment adding new scope to the 
basic development contract. 
Of the two types of additional financing requirements, over-
run situations probably represent the more acute problem from the 
standpoint of immediate contractor need. This is due to the fact that 
overruns, by definition, occur at the maximum cost limitation point 
of a contract, while new scope negotiations may or may not be conducted 
at a contractual financial point of completion which permits continuation 
of uninterrupted activity. 
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However, irrespective of whether the particular task under 
consideration is new scope or overrun, the timing of financial support 
for contractor activity is extremely important in research and develop-
ment work. Any failure of the cognizant Technical Service to make 
funds available at the time they are required for most efficient technical 
action results inevitably in an over-all project cost increase, a corol-
lary of which ·is a decreased contractor fee percentage. Such a delay 
is especially frustrating to a research organization management which 
has reached complete agreement with the sponsoring agency technical 
staff on appropriate measures to be taken but is prevented from initiating 
these measures by a backlog of contractual paper work requiring amend-
ment in the agency's Contracts Department. A directive on this subject 
by one of the military departments states that 11 It is further emphasized 
that verbal instructions or agreements between technical personnel of 
the ... and ... Company personnel as to the technical approach to 
correct difficulties or improve performance does not authorize the 
Company to exceed the expenditure limitation on the contract until such 
time as the contract is amended to provide any additional funds required. 11 
The most effective research and development groups are 
those confining their efforts to a given field. This avoids the high 
operating costs created by use of personnel outside the boundaries of 
their experience and skill while simultaneously providing maximum 
utilization of the expensive special purpose equipment needed in· modern 
experimental programs. For such a group to be suddenly out of funds 
means either excessive 11 downtime" costs, taking the risk of performing 
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work not officially authorized, or disrupting the organization by a 
reduction in staff. There is rarely opportunity for large scale personnel 
transfers. The timing of the financial support is, therefore, almost as 
important to project success as the support itself. 
C. Contractor Capital Problems 
An industrial organization performing research and develop-
ment activity for the Government encounters immediately three of the 
four capital requirements almost standard within modern industry. 
These requirements are for working capital needed for cash and work~ 
in process inventory, and fixed capital needed for purchase of capital 
equipment. The fourth normal industrial capital requirement for 
accounts receivable does not occur to any significant degree in this 
field because of the monthly (or even more frequent) reimbursement 
procedure utilized under CPFF work to cover billable costs. 
1. Cash 
When a characteristic industrial concern receives a relatively 
large research and development contract, its need for cash to meet 
expenses suddenly becomes acute. The funds required to meed expanded 
payrolls, provide additional services, and purchase necessary materials 
and components increase sharply over normal operating demands. 
While some of these cash expenses (direct labor and direct contract 
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material purchases) are reimbursable normally within a month after 
payment under a fully executed contract, other indirect costs may not 
be completely recovered until the next negotiated rate period if the 
company is using a negotiated overhead rate plan, or until such time 
as actual overhead costs are known under the actual.overhead rate 
system. If the company is starting work on the -basis of a letter of 
intent, only the letter stipulated percentage of direct costs incurred 
can be reimbursed by the cognizant Government Audit Agency. The 
situation is further aggravated by the fact that the cost of dealings with 
the source of external working capital most frequently utilized by 
industry, the commercial bank, constitutes an unallowable expense 
under Government CPFF contract regulations. Section XV of the ASPR 
specifies that 11 Interest on borrowings (however represented) bond 
discount and expenses, and financing charges 11 are considered as items 
of unallowable costs. This effectively means that interest charges on 
working capital borrowed for operations connected with a Government 
contract must be paid for out of the profit on the contract. 
These peak requirements, combined with the unavoidable 
premium cost of borrowed capital, make any research and development 
contractor especially anxious to maintain a sound cash position. There 
are many contractual factors which hamper the achievement of this 
goal, however. Work being conducted under a letter of intent, a lapsed 
appropriation, an anticipatory cost clause, or an unexecuted overrun 
or new scope proposal requires the commitment of company funds under 
varying degrees of risk for periods which may extend in considerable 
excess of thirty days. 
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Although interest charges on borrowed capital are unallow-
able as an overhead cost item under a CPFF contract, in actual practice, 
extensive use is made by research and development contractors of 
various types of guaranteed loans. 
2. Guaranteed Loans 
Guaranteed loans are authorized by Section 301 of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 (P. L. 774, 81 st Congress) which provides that 
the President may authorize the Department of the Army, Navy and 
Air Force to guarantee loans made by any public or private financing 
institution for the purpose of financing contractors in connection with 
the performance of any contract deemed by the guaranteeing agency to 
be necessary to expedite production or services for the national defense. 
This law is implemented by Executlve Order 10161 dated 
9 September 1950, and by Regulation V issued by the Federal Reserve 
Board, effective 27 September 1950. In general, the procedures follow 
those in effect in connection with V -loans in World War II. 
The maximum rate of interest chargeable for a guaranteed 
loan, as set by the Federal Reserve Board, is 5 percent. In most cases, 
the annual rate of interest charged varies between 4 and 4 1/2 percent. 
This cost is usually absorbed by the contractor as an unallowable General 
and Administrative expense. 
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3. Work in Process Inventory 
The term 11 work in process inventory" has a specialized 
meaning in the field of accounting for CPFF research and development 
work. Work in process here consists of (a) current period costs not 
billable to the purchaser until the following month, and (b) prior 
months 1 costs not billable because of restrictive contract or letter of 
intent clauses or lack of formal contract coverage. Under fixed price 
research and development contracts, all equipment which has not been 
approved by the cognizant Government inspection agency for shipment 
is considered as work in process. 
A contractor must often walk a tight rope between the extremes 
of over extension of inventory position due to temporarily uncollectible 
costs incurred with their accompanying recovery risk and the danger 
of delays causing additional work costs and technical progress lag 
created by fai:.ure to act at the appropriate development time. 
Since 11 work in process inventory" represents the greatest 
single source of company capital investment in any one period in this 
field, monthly accounting statements on the increase or decrease of 
this item are scrutinized closely by management personnel. The 
company Contracts Department issues frequent reports on the status 
of unbillable contracts, together with information on progress being 
made towards converting inventory costs into billable costs. The atti-
tude of the industrial contractor with regard to undertaking new or 
continuing existing development work on the basis of informal agree-
ments is shaped to a major extent by his "in process inventory. " 
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4, Capital Equipment 
The increased complexity of electronic research and devel-
opment effort in recent years has created a need in this field for every 
contractor to have available a wide variety of expensive capital equip-
ment capable of performing the intricate operations of the industry. 
While the exact definition of a capital item varies slightly 
within companies, capital equipment is generally considered as an 
item which has a relatively long useful life and is of sufficient dollar 
value to justify the maintenance of property records. Most organiza-
tions establish an arbitrary dollar value dividing line between items to 
be capitalized and those to be charged off to expense. A common point 
of separation is a one hundred dollar ($1 00) unit cost. 
Budgeting capital equipment requirements for a research 
and development laboratory constitutes one of operating management's 
perpetual difficulties. On one hand is the need for more and more pre-
cision machine tools and mechanical and electronic test equipment to 
meet contractual development commitments effectively. On the other 
hand is management's recognition of the fact that 11 The desires of 
research personnel for equipment are apparently limitless; there simply 
is not enough money available to purchase the total am<:'unt of equipment 
which research workers would like to have, nor enough productive 
capacity to meet these requests if the money could be found. 11 * 
To strike a realistic compromise between these two conflict-
ing viewpoints while still remaining within the limitations of available 
*1, p. 271 
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company finances is no easy task. A single machine which may be 
utilized for only a small percentage of the program may require a 
capital investment of $50, 000 or more. Yet, because it is the only 
machine capable of performing the required job, lack of it may hinder 
the progress of an important development contract to an extent far 
beyond the purchase price. Additionally, it is quite possible for the 
new capital equipment investment required to perform a research and 
development contract to equal or exceed the total contract fixed fee to 
be received for performing the work. Faced with this dilemma, the 
contractor may turn to the sponsoring government agency for assistance 
in the form of Government-Furnished Equipment. 
5. Government-Furnished Equipment 
Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) is equipment in 
the possession of or acquired by the Government and delivered or 
made available to the contractor for use in the performance of a 
Government contract. 
The pros and cons of GFE and the procedures necessary for 
its acquisition by a contractor constitute a topic generally outside of the 
scope of this paper. However, to touch upon this subject as it relates 
to the contractor's capital equipment problem, it may be stated that 
the Government seeks to award research and development contracts 
to those companies who possess or agree to purchase the necessary 
facilities. Towards this end, all Government agency requests for 
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proposals involving research and development specify that the bidder 
supply a 11 detailed description of the facilities available for carrying 
on the proposed work. 11 Since the scope of the research may be so 
broad that no company is willing to invest the tremendous sums required 
for capital equipment on a purely military application, or a contractor's 
technical competence and/or Government desire for research source 
diversification override the factor of available equipment, the Govern-
ment often finds itself in the position of having to furnish a research 
and development contractor with special machinery and equipment 
required for contract performance. Determination of the nature and 
extent of the GFE to be supplied then becomes an important part of the 
contract negotiations. The Government position is that extensive con-
tractor GFE requirements should be reflected in a lowered contract 
fixed fee. 
In connection with GFE, the Government makes a sharp 
distinction between items of a standard nature and those of a special 
purpose type. The following quotation from a standard Government 
document furnished to electronic equipment bidders illustrates this 
point: 
Peculiar Test Equipments are those types of test 
equipment designed or procured for the purpose 
of performing tests peculiar to specific airborne 
radio, radar, electrical and associated equipments. 
General Purpose Test Equipments are those types 
of test equipment for which the end use is not 
restricted to specific items of military equipments 
but which may be used on several electronic 
equipments. 
As a general policy, the-.· .. will not furnish items 
of general purpose test equipment to commercial 
contractors nor will these be chargeable items 
under a cost-plus -a-fixed-fee type contract. 
Items of peculiar test equipment may be furnished 
to commercial contractors from government stocks 
either by contract change or amendment or they 
may be separately procured and charged under a 
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type contract with the-
approval of the- ---. 
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In special cases where a contractor has no require-
ments for general purpose test equipment aside from 
a specific contract and when the interests of the 
government will be better served, required general 
purpose test equipment may be furnished by the 
government. This includes making available to 
the contractor large and expensive test equipments 
located at government laboratories, 
Upon completion of a contract under which test 
equipment has been furnished or procured at 
government expense such test equipment shall be 
reported to the ... for disposition. 
It is clear then that the problem of acquiring adequate equip-
ment to perform a research and development contract really revolves 
about the procurement of major items of standard capital equipment. 
Government objections to the supply of this type of equipment are 
typically expressed in this recent statement regarding a contractor's 
request for standard GFE from a Government review source: 
If the contractor intends to stay in the Research and 
Development business he should provide standard 
laboratory equipment not of a heavy specialized 
nature that would be considered a capital investment 
item. 
Provision of this equipment would place the contractor 
in a favored competitive position at Government expense. 
To this reasoning the contractor replies that the immediate 
purely military non-repetitive nature of the majority of electronic 
research and development being conducted for the Government, makes 
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any large investment in fixed capital assets beyond that dictated by his 
normal operating situation an unsound management policy since it will 
probably result in a heavy unused fixed asset structure upon completion 
of the program. Secondly, the high fixed asset capital investment 
required in comparison to the relatively low fixed fee finally earned 
under CPFF contracts makes such a transaction economically unattrac-
tive even after use of a certificate of necessity. The almost standard 
practice in the electronics industry today regarding usage of Government-
Furnished Equipment when proposed research and development program 
requirements exceed normal company capital equipment budgets, makes 
the subject of a 11 favored contractor competitive position" largely an 
academic issue. 
The Government's post-Korea attitude toward the GFE ques-
tion has been constantly stiffening with the result that the matter of 
adequate standard capital equipment has become a serious financial 
issue to companies interested in the research and development field. 
6. Capital Equipment Budgets 
In order to handle the financing of capital equipment items 
on a logical basis, most research and development organizations are 
moving in the direction of a capital equipment budget. 
This budget is established on an annual or company fiscal 
year basis to cover all requirements for capital equipment to be com-
pany financed. Normally, it represents a total of estimated annual 
foreseeable requirements submitted by laboratory group or department 
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heads and "beefed up" or trimmed by the laboratory manager in 
accordance with his appraisal of prevailing executive policy on capital 
equipment. Unlike most research and development planning which tends, 
of necessity, to be quite flexible, such a budget is relatively rigid 
after approval since it involves company cash and financial forecasts 
and is not easily adjustable. The total is usually calculated on an 
over-all dollar value rather than detailed by item since it is impossible 
to predict exact individual requirements for any appreciable future 
period of time in research and development. Within this restriction, 
operating management usually has a considerable amount of latitude in 
purchasing equipment requirements. 
The size of the budget is finally determined by top manage-
ment's evaluation of the company financial situation and is, of course, 
invariably completely inadequate from the standpoint of engineering 
personnel. In many instances, the ceiling is computed as a percentage 
of annual predicted sales or profits. In other cases, it may be confined 
to a dollar limit equivalent to or a stipulated percentage above current 
non-cash income being received through depreciation charges on 
presently owned equipment. 
In addition to cash required for company financed capital 
equipment, it is sometimes necessary for a contractor to finance 
temporarily the purchase of equipment to be Government-furnished. 
This situation arises under the same circumstances which require 
the contractor to perform necessary technical work in advance of 
formal contract coverage. Critical development work may be incapable 
of immediate execution because of the lack of a specific machine tool 
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or test apparatus, approval for the procurement of which is being 
processed by the cognizant technical agency. On the strength of informal 
assurance of expenditure authorization the contractor may purchase the 
unit for immediate use. After receipt of expenditure authorization, 
reimbursement may be claimed by the contractor and title passed to 
the Government. These transactions add to the temporarily frozen 
funds held by the contractor in various inventories pending receipt of 
authorization to bill. 
These two types of capital equipment expenditures combine 
to make the capital equipment account one of the chief cash drains on 
research and development management. 
D. Stabilized Program Financing 
1. The Contractor's Problem 
A problem shared to some extent by the small contractor but 
fundamentally one experienced by large scale research and development 
activities centers about the question of stabilized program financing. 
In some respects this may be termed an issue created by success for 
it occurs most noticeably in an organization which has achieved recog-
nition in a specialized area of electronic research and development. 
As a result of this specialization the company tends over a 
period of time to form a close working liaison with agencies of the 
Department of Defense particularly interested in its field of activity. 
55 
This occurrence has been mentioned in the preceding section on New 
Scope. Continued progress under the contractual auspices of a sponsor 
agency or agencies leads naturally to expanded work schedules and 
ultimately to a situation where the research and development program 
planning of the contractor and the cognizant military department becomes, 
to a large extent, identical. 
At this point the contractor begins to encounter the difficulties 
common to all manufacturers dependent upon a single purchaser for the 
majority of their production capacity. Having gradually built up a 
large activity in order to carry out the major high priority contracts 
awarded him as a result of his past success, the contractor now finds 
that his ability to maintain a level contractual work load and a stable 
research organization is being governed essentially by the annual finan-
cial planning policies of the supporting Government agency. 
The recent trend in Government research and development 
financing toward the installment and phased type contract has accentu-
ated this cyclical influence since the use of these work media results 
in funds being allotted on an annual rather than project basis. While 
the "pay as you go" annual financial commitment method has certain 
advantages to the Government, it must be recognized that research and 
development is by nature a long-run proposition. Many, perhaps most, 
of the significant research and development projects being presently 
conducted in the electronics industry contemplate completion dates of 
two or more years from work inception. It, therefore, is essential 
for the contractor to be aware at an early date of the agency's long 
range fiscal planning affecting the contracts held by his company so 
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that he can schedule future operations with a definite degree of stability. 
The specialized skills required today for electronic research and devel-
opment and the keen industrial competition for their hire, make the 
build-up of an efficient laboratory a gradual function of time, money, 
morale, and superior engineering management. It becomes, from a 
practical standpoint, impossible to rapidly contract and then expand an 
organization of this type and still retain its effectiveness as a research 
unit. The results of such an attempt are revealed graphically in the 
following contractor's explanation of an impending overrun: 
The overrun on the development of the ... is attri-
buted to several outstanding factors. The first 
factor existed when ... was informed by ... that a 
temporary reduction in work rate was necessary to 
tide over the then existing funds until more money 
could be made available. This reduction in effort 
necessitated: 
1. Transferring of certain key personnel to 
other projects. 
2. Suspension of expensive items being made 
by outside vendors. 
3. Reduction of any expensive operations 
normally required in the development, 
such as aircraft flights, etc. 
When the normal rate effort was resumed, it took 
considerable time to reclaim the transferred per-
sonnel, to arrange for vendors to begin producing 
again, and to gain access to the aircraft in the 
flight program. The over-all delay in the basic 
development program due to the necessary reduc-
tions of work effort during the past two years is 
estimated to be about four (4) months. 
In addition to the necessity for close Government-Contractor 
financial planning liaison on existing contracts, the long term nature of 
research and development work dictates that constant consideration be 
given to the matter of a balanced work backlog within the organization. 
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Thus, as contracts begin to approach their conclusion with a resultant 
fall-off in man hours of engineering activity, management efforts must 
be increasingly devoted to the subject of full laboratory capacity utiliza-
tion. Here again, the research contractor requires some advance indi-
cation of the sponsoring agency's future research and development plans 
as they relate to his company. Depending on the scope of these plans, 
it is either advisable for him to (a) seek actively new sources of support 
who may be interested in his talents and facilities and attempt to negoti-
ate business with them or (b) continue current rate of operations with 
the knowledge that, upon completion of e~isting programs, laboratory 
research capacity will be utilized on new contract work for the benefit 
of the present cognizant military department. 
In either case, the prime interest of the contractor is the 
uninterrupted maintenance of a stable level of operation which will 
permit him to conduct his research and development work with no dis-
ruption of personnel or facilities. By so doing, he insures the simul-
taneous achievement of maximum operating efficiency and profit. 
2. The Government's Problem 
The problem of stabilized program financing is complicated 
from the standpoint of the military department sponsoring research 
and development activities because of the fact that the extent of the work 
which may be conducted each year is almost completely dependent upon 
the appropriation received from Congress. This, in turn, is dependent 
upon many factors other than technical desirability, political, military 
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and economic is sues being the dominating influences. A significant 
amount of instability is automatically built in the Government research 
programs by this procedure. 
Secondly, the legal limitations regarding usage of appropri-
ations prevent the agencies from taking any steps to even out annual 
research fluctuations. Funds obtained for research and development 
bear the requirement that they must be committed in the year of their 
Congressional appropriation or else returned to the Treasury. The 
net effect of this regulation is to create a situation whereby each June 
a flood of research and development contracts are issued to industry 
by all agencies of the Department of Defense in order to avoid having 
to return any uncommitted funds in the various departments at the end 
of the fiscal year (June 30). The need for having to resort to such a 
procedure comes about because of the fact that each Government agency 
annually reserves funds for new programs planned for activation in 
the current fiscal year. When it becomes apparent, generally late in 
the fiscal period, that it is not presently advisable to start certain of 
these programs, the earmarked funds become available for current 
"deferred item'" procurements:. This does not appear to be the ideal 
way to schedule long term financing commitments. 
Aviation Week, a leading publication of aircraft industry 
activities, remarked editorially on this subject as follows:* 
*11, p. 75 
A major problem in developing a sound qualitative 
foundation for future production programs is 
counteracting the effects of the annual fluctuations 
of the defense budget. Unless development projects 
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and research programs can be planned and financed 
over normal development cycles that will insure 
completion of the work involved they will produce 
few tangible benefits. 
A solution seems to be stabilization of the research 
and development budget over five -year periods and 
allowing the budget fluctuations to be absorbed in 
other areas where the relationship between world 
tensions and increased budgets is more direct. 
The mounting conviction that military research and develop-
ment work must be continued in this country without interruption for 
an indefinite period of years makes it extremely important that the 
system of work financing possess sufficient flexibility to avoid wide 
swings in activity due to temporary influences. 
V. Bidding Aspects of Research and Development 
A. Program~ Estimating Methods 
1. Source of Estimating ~ 
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The project cost estimate is generally based upon data drawn 
from two sources ~ the Request for Quotation and the company technical 
proposal. The Request for Quotation defines the items to be procured, 
applicable military specifications, desired delivery schedules, Govern-
ment inspection requirements, and pertinent contractual and legal 
provisions. The company technical proposal, prepared in answer to 
the request, describes the research methods and engineering tech:ctiques 
recommended for the project and discusses exceptions which the con-
tractor wishes to take to any items, requirements, or specifications 
of the bid invitation. 
2. Determination of the Bid 
If the proposed contract constitutes an extensive project, the 
determination of the over -all bid is normally undertaken as a group 
function. The extreme complexity of research and development in the 
electronics field today makes impossible any other arrangement, A 
typical contract may require the services of a wide variety of engineer-
ing, mathematical, designing, drafting, machine shop, electrical, 
flight testing, and administrative talents. 
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In order to compile a detailed cost estimate, the program 
is usually broken down into two categories - engineering functions and 
service functions. Engineering assignments are in turn divided into 
task or unit responsibilities, each task representing one major compo-
nent of the over-all planned system. Starting at these unit points, the 
project supervisor and his engineering aides, utilizing their past devel-
opment experience, engineering design know-how, pertinent company 
historical cost data, and the latest crystal ball techniques attempt to 
estimate the number of engineers and the period of elapsed time required 
to design and develop each system component. The extent to which the 
task engineering analyses go into cost detail usually depends on the 
personality of the project supervisor. One school of thought recommends 
a meticulous consideration of every known factor, another school favors 
the 11 broad brush" approach. The unknown quantities generally out-
weigh the known factors to the point where there does not appear to be 
any significant difference in estimating results. One well known engi-
neering consultant discussing problems of research and development 
cost determination in a recent publication notes that ... 
the foundation for the cost estimate is almost 
entirely the project engineer's guess that so many 
men of specified grades will be needed for so 
many months. No matter how the project is 
broken down and analyzed, despite whatever 
accounting magic is applied, we return to just 
this, an educated guess of so many men, so 
many months. The guess includes some strange 
elements, usually the hope that brilliant solutions 
will occur to bright young men while they are 
shaving. For such reasons overruns are very 
common in the best of research and development 
organizations.* 
*13, pp. 234-236 
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Having totaled the project engineering man-month require-
ments by multiplying each estimated task engineering group by the 
contemplated task time schedule, the estimating staff requests bids 
from the non-engineering or service functions. Using as reference 
data, the quotation request, the company technical proposal and the 
engineering manpower appraisal, the involved service activities pre-
pare their estimates. These may include items such as mechanical 
and electrical fabrication, manufacturing drawings, reports and oper-
ating instruction handbooks, and specification compliance testing. The 
quc:ation forms used for computing each type of effort are specifically 
tailored to meet the peculiar requirements of that group and contain 
check point lists designed to remind the estimator of the potential 
pitfalls which may be encountered. 
In many service groups, years of experience in research 
and development work have resulted in estimating rules of thumb which 
sometimes prove to be surprisingly accurate. Thus, standard ratios 
of shop hours to designing hours, quantity of manufacturing drawings 
to number of equipment tubes, design approval testing hours to planned 
engineering hours, cost of reports to value of contract etc., become 
accepted and used for want of more factual information. Depending on 
the nature of the contract and the predic:tability of components to be 
used, material requirements may be computed in detail or inserted as 
a percentage estimate of the engineering costs. Since expenditures 
for material constitute a comparatively small portion of the contract 
when measured against direct labor costs, it would require a major 
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error in material usage forecasting to effect the contract price 
appreciably. 
As the final step, the various group manpower estimates 
are assembled and converted into the formal cost quotation. This is 
accomplished by multiplying the man-month work estimate for each 
category of direct labor by its average monthly wage rate to arrive at 
a project estimated labor cost. The total of these costs, material 
purchase estimates, applicable overheads, and proposed fixed fee 
constitutes the cost-plus -fixed-fee proposal. Somewhere during this 
process, a precautionary safety factor intended to compensate for 
"engineering optimism" is usually built into the quotation by a staff 
member, After review by supervisory engineering and management 
personnel, the finished product is delivered to the Contract or Sales 
Department for forwarding to the cognizant military agency. 
B, Variable Influences in Project Cost Estimating 
The inability of anyone to foresee and set a price on the 
technical problems which will have to be solved in converting a new 
design concept into a working engineering system makes any project 
cost estimate a hazardous venture at best. 
In addition to the purely technical risks, there must be 
added the cost dangers imposed by random events over which the 
individual project supervisor has little or no control. Some of these 
items influencing cost are: 
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1. Price Changes 
Where many of the fixed price contracts negotiated with the 
Government contain clauses providing for price redetermination upon 
noteworthy changes in direct labor or mater~al costs, the CPFF con-
tract typically does not. Since the cognizant agency is liable for all 
allowable costs anyway, this contract provision is not considered 
necessary. However, since large scale research and development 
contracts may run for several years, many contractors find recent 
significant increases in labor and material costs a contributing factor 
to overruns. 
2. Overhead Rate Changes 
If the bidder is using, as are many organizations performing 
research and development work, a negotiated overhead rate instead of 
an actual one, his quotation necessarily is computed on company current 
negotiated rates. Any change in subsequent negotiated rates during 
the period of contract performance affects his cost of operation in 
direct proportion to the overhead variation. This subject will be dis-
cussed further in the chapter on Project Cost Budgeting and Control. 
3. Military Usage Changes 
In general, equipment being developed today by Government 
contractors for military application falls within some section of a 
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national weapons systems plan. This weapons concept is part of an 
over -all master program designed to integrate most effectively the 
development and supply of defense systems. Delivery of components 
going into this program is carefully time phased to provide the best 
possible answer to security demands. Electronic equipment, being 
an integral part of almost every major weapons system, is particularly 
susceptible to this timing influence. Thus, an electronic apparatus 
being developed for application with a certain aircraft may be suddenly 
rescheduled for use in a different airplane. A shift in planning such 
as this may result in extensive changes in the equipment design to 
insure compatibility with the particular aircraft for which it is now 
scheduled. 
C. Standardization Problems in Bidding 
A fundamental pricing problem in a research and development 
proposal with which both the bidder and cognizant Government agency 
have to contend stems from the fact that frequently there exists no 
standard recognized approach to the technical question posed by the 
proposal request. Each research contractor, accordingly, builds and 
prices his quotation around a specific design philosophy which shares 
the common project objective but which may be completely different 
from other proposals in equipment operating principle. The resulting 
price estimate will, of course, vary directly with the simplicity or 
complexity of the proposed development program and the extent to 
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which the bidder believes it necessary to advance "the state of the 
art. 11 Cost estimates submitted by competing concerns for the same 
project may, on this basis, differ by wide margins. 
I. Contractors' Briefing 
In an attempt to minimize potential areas of misunderstanding 
and resolve as many basic considerations as possible prior to bid pres-
entation, the Services often rely Oil a Contractors' Briefing. Under 
this plan, all concerns believed to be interested in submitting a bid 
are invited to send representatives to a pre -proposal 11 briefing" where 
the procuring agency outlines the purpose and functions of the desired 
apparatus and discusses possible methods of equipment operation. The 
meeting is then thrown open for a question and answer period on the 
technical and contractual aspects of the program. The amount of agree-
ment which can be reached through this medium is necessarily quite 
limited, however, and few technical proposals will possess any great 
degree of similarity. 
D. Specifications~ ~Cost Estimating Factor 
A relatively unpublicized but quite important contributor 
to the cost prediction worries of the research contractor is the factor 
of design specifications. 
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1. JAN Specifications 
Over a period of years, the Government has gradually 
developed a set of specifications intended to define exactly the operating, 
test, and component requirements which any equipment procured for 
military application must meet. These are known as JAN (Joint Army-
Navy) or MIL (Military) specifications and are included where applicable 
in all electronic research and development contracts. The need for 
JAN specifications has evolved from the demands of modern technological 
warfare. Since it is impossible to predict the climatic or operating 
conditions in which the equipment may have to be used, the technical 
competence of the operator, or the amount of time available for equip-
ment maintenance,. extremely rigorous standards are established in 
the 11 specs 11 regarding ruggedness of construction, performance ability 
under climatic extremes, simplicity of operation, and minimization of 
maintenance. In addition, the desire of the military departments to 
avoid the necessity of stocking large supplies of varied spare parts for 
each individual equipment has resulted in a "Quafified ~.roducts List 
which the contractor must use in selecting standard equipment compo-
nents. While all these regulations have a sound and practical value to 
the government, they place costly restrictions on the flexibility and ease 
of development work. 
2. The Development Philosophy Regarding JAN Specifications 
The typical research and development cost estimate is 
originally based upon the construction of an equipment capable of 
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performing the objectives of the project and proving the feasibility of 
the system. The refinements of JAN specifications are at this point 
a matter of secondary interest since they will be pertinent only if the 
development project itself is successful. The standards and specifica-
tions which the equipment will actually meet will be those common to 
all commercial electronic devices, modified by the realization that 
JAN requirements will ultimately have to be satisfied. Measurement 
of the additional cost necessary to convert a working commercial grade 
equipment into a JAN unit is a difficult assignment. Many times con~ 
tractors will seek to evade this problem entirely by requesting in the 
proposal a waiver of JAN specifications in favor of a model built to 
"best commercial practice" using JAN specifications as a guide. In 
this way, involved and expensive redesign of a system working satis-
factorily under expected conditions but not meeting some of the JAN 
requirements may be avoided. Where this procedure is not acceptable 
to the cognizant Government agency, the design problem becomes 
vastly more complicated. In the fast changing field of electronics, 
often there is no JAN specification which covers the advanced design 
of the proposed equipment and the contractor must base his estimates 
on the costs of meeting a tentative or currently unattainable specifica-
tion requirement. Efforts to make the steadily increasing complexity 
of electronic equipment compatible with the JAN requirements of 
simplicity and reliability of operation with a minimum of required 
maintenance create new difficulties even after operating design problems 
have been solved. One experienced development project engineer told 
the writer half-seriously, half-jokingly, that his proposal formula was 
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to estimate to his best ability the development cost for a commercial 
grade model and then multiply by four to compensate for the JAN require-
ments. While this ratio may be somewhat exaggerated, his comment 
serves to illustrate effectively the point that designing to JAN specifica-
tions represents an expense not so much consumed in true development 
as in product refinement. 
Many engineers believe that the Government emphasis on 
building development models to JAN specifications almost represents 
a practice of putting last things first. Since only a small proportion 
of development projects ever go into production, the practice of building 
every unit to the most exacting requirements is an expensive one 
from the standpoint of returns on investment. 
VI. Budgeting Aspects of Research and Development 
A. Project Cost Budgeting and Control 
1. Inherent Difficulties 
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Taken as a group, there are probably no people in industry 
less interested in budgetary and accounting principles, or more 
frustrating for a cost analyst to deal with, than research and develop-
ment engineers. The following quotation from a recent broad study of 
scientific research activities in modern industry seems to express 
agreement with this opinion as well as to indicate that the frustration 
may be, to some extent, mutual: 11 The research worker dislikes paper 
work of all kinds, especially accounting reports and documents. One 
research director urges: 'Avoid encounters of your men with auditors 
and accountants. Such encounters may totally incapacitate an able-
bodied worker for a full week."'* 
A supplementary problem to this is created by the fact that 
the intangible and unforeseeable aspects of research and development 
make any budget which may be established obsolete almost as fast as it 
is prepared. Very few budgets, after a year of operations, bear much 
resemblance to their original format. This is particularly true in 
contracts where efforts are devoted primarily to research rather than 
development work. 
In spite of these obstacles, practically every development 
laboratory maintains a record of and measures actual costs incurred 
*1, p. 58 
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against some sort of budget. In the case of fixed price contracts, this 
information is necessary to reveal profits and provide data for price 
renegotiation; in CPFF work, contract reimbursement provisions make~ 
such records mandatory. Usually, the paper work connected with the 
establishment and supervision of such budgets is handled by administra-
tive personnel working within the engineering groups on a staff basis. 
The intent of this course is to free all technical people from administra-
tive responsibilities as much as possible while still enabling management 
to operate efficiently through staff personnel well aware of the program 
objectives and general problems. 
2. Budgeting Procedure 
Upon receipt of a new project, the project supervisor and/or 
department manager breaks the contract into a logical group of task 
assignments. Each task spells out a specific area of work, designates 
a responsible group engineer and carries a maximum cost limitation 
acceptable to that engineer. Depending on the type of contract and the 
method of cost estimating used in the quotation preparation, the task 
budget limit may be purely an arbitrarily established percentage of the 
contract total or it may be closely correlated to the original bid. The 
total of the various tasks agrees with the contract value, less any agreed 
upon safety reserve withheld by the project supervisor for e,mergency 
use. Each task is identified by an accounting sub-number, keyed within 
an over-all contract master accounting number. The company accounting 
department uses these numbers to accrue and publish the actual labor 
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costs of the project as recorded by direct labor personnel on time cards 
and the actual material costs as specified on purchase orders and stores 
requisitions. 
3. Cost Reporting Procedures 
In many organizations, the preparation and distribution of 
official accounting reports represents an involved and time consuming 
operation. Companies performing CPFF contracts where each labor, 
material and stores charge has to be painstakingly documented by 
original labor records or invoices suffer especially in this regard. 
Because of the rapid changes which can occur in the financial status of 
a research and development project, any time lag in cost reporting 
lessens the value of the information considerably. Regular accounting 
schedules released three to four weeks after the end of the report 
period do not have much budgetary control worth to a rapidly moving 
research laboratory concerned with problems of limited project balances, 
contract maximum cost ceilings and overrun notification requirements. 
This time lag is more acute than appears at first glance since an 
accounting schedule released one month after the fact results in a 
two month information gap before publication of the next report. 
Effectively, then, there is close to a two month lag in available cost 
information at the maximum point of time delay just prior to accounting 
record distribution. 
An additional limiting factor to the value of official accounting 
records as a budgetary control device exists because of the ability of 
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these reports to recognize only actual contract expenditures. This is 
not the complete information which a research and development con-
tractor requires to exercise effective control over contract finances. 
Because of the intricacies of modern research and development, it is 
almost impossible for any concern, regardless of its facilities, to 
perform all aspects of a large program. A certain amount of work is 
generally subcontracted out to companies specializing in the involved 
tasks. Such subcontracts may constitute an important share of the 
contract total value. Company official accounting documents specify 
only that portion of the subcontract amount which has been actually 
paid by the prime contractor. The reports show therefore only the 
unexpended contract balance rather than the uncommitted balance which 
is the data really needed for control purposes. 
To overcome these drawbacks, it is common practice for a 
research and development laboratory to collect and distribute internally 
approximate project cost information through a system outside of the 
company books of account. This procedure involves a duplication of 
effort since many of the same source documents must be used by per-
sonnel within the laboratory that are referred to by the accounting 
department for its compilation of official reports. However, since 
considerable time is saved by elimination of the need to verify detail 
figures and observe formal debit and credit principles, this duplication 
is considered worthwhile from research management's viewpoint, As 
payroll figures in most companies are available quickly, project labor 
cost estimates may be readily built around these data, using either 
actual dollar costs or man hours multiplied by average wage rates. 
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Material costs may be calculated either by obtaining advance copies of 
accounts payable transactions for the report month or, as is done in 
some laboratories, dealing completely on a commitment basis. Under 
a commitment system, the estimated cost of the procurement is written 
off as a contract charge when the purchase order or material requisi-
tion is placed. After obtaining this basic direct cost information as 
soon as possible after close of the report period, proper overhead and 
profit factors are added and an informal project cost statement rapidly 
issued to operating personnel within the laboratory showing estimated 
expenditure or commitment activity for the report period, plus cumula-
tive cost data through the period. Deviations from the official schedules 
are corrected automatically in the fo1.lowing month's statement by 
revising the cumulative to date cost totals. 
4, External Influences 
Assuming that up-to-date, although unofficial, cost data can 
be conveniently furnished to the project supervisor for comparison 
with task budgets, there still remains a fundamental question to be 
answered. How much of the research and development program cost 
is really within the control of the engineering staff? A critical look 
at this point seems to indicate that while many phases of the work are 
under complete control of the project supervisor, there are also manv 
external influences affecting the cost situation over which the engineering 
department has little or no control. Some of the external influences 
are: 
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a. Overhead Rate Changes 
The determination of acceptable overhead rates at various 
levels of capacity has always been a problem in Government contracts, 
A widely used system in research and development work today involves 
the adoption of negotiated overhead rates. Under this procedure, rates 
are established for the contractor's costing use during a given period 
{usually six months) by negotiation between the company and the 
Government. Current period rates are based on company actual over-
head experience in the previous rate period. Thus a contractor awarded 
a contract in a period of low negotiated overhead rates may find his 
cost of work performance much higher following a change in rate periods. 
Since the contract cost is frozen, the variance between overhead rates 
must be compensated for by a proportionate reduction in the direct 
labor dollars available for research. While it may be argued that, over 
a period of time, this situation will average out, as negotiated and actual 
rates must eventually balance, it can create considerable fluctuation 
in any given contractual financial balance. 
b. ~Changes 
Although the budget established at the start of a program 
remains fixed, the project supervisor often finds that costs are not. 
Most major research and development contracts extend over a period 
of several years. In an era of rising prices as has been the case in 
the last few years, increases in project costs due to labor and material 
76 
price rises have been common. These increases must be financed out 
of a contract negotiated in a period of lower prices for both labor and 
material, leaving the engineer fewer man hours of available engineering 
than was originally planned. 
A second item over which the contractor has little control 
is that occasioned by the Government attitude toward treatment of 
special costs. While the presumptive advantage of CPFF work is that 
costs do not consitute a reimbursement problem, the contractor, if 
he is not careful, will find himself negotiating costs as well as fee. 
Section XV of the AFPR allows the contracting officer discretion in the 
acceptance of certain special charges as direct contract costs. A fre-
quent special cost is that incurred by the contractor for plant rearrange-
ment or leaseheld improvement deemed necessary to further a specific 
program. There are several possible ways of handling these expenses -
as a direct contract charge, as an immediate charge to overhead expense, 
or as a capitalized cost to be written off over a period of years. The 
method of accounting selected will appreciably affect the immediate 
financial status of the contract under consideration since the costs for 
this type of plant improvement are usually fairly heavy. A consistent 
policy on the part of the contracting officer on this point is essential 
or the contractor becomes unable to predict the costs of any research 
involving plant improvements. 
c. Contract Lot Cost Segregation 
Occasionally the financial allotment for a research and devel-
opment contract is divided by the cognizant military agency into a group 
77 
of contract lots ~ each lot possessing a separate fiscal identity. This 
is usually done when the project is being financed under several appro-
priations and it is desirable from a Government standpoint to have a 
record of the costs against each appropriation. The contract specifies 
that charges to each lot must be segregated from all other lots and 
that funds appropriated for one lot are not available for payment of 
costs against any other lot. The project, instead of being one financial 
problem, becomes under this arrangement a set of individual problems 
within the framework of one contract. For example, it is quite possible 
to have sufficient funds in the contract to cover a:l work and yet be 
forced to apply for an overrun because of an overspent condition on 
one particular contract lot. 
Also, while it is a simple matter to segregate the contract 
into individually financed lots, technical work segregation is much 
more difficult to achieve. Since the research and development require-
ments of these lots often interweave and overlap, certain types of 
charge allocations to any specific lot become an arbitrary decision. 
Under these conditions, cost-budget comparisons are hopelessly 
distorted as charges within the contract tend to be made to various 
lots according to their financial balances rather than on the basis of 
work expended. 
d. Background Research 
Most research and development contracts contain a fairly 
definite list of item requirements to be met by the contractor. It is 
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not difficult to break these items down into work tasks for budgetary 
purposes on a logical if somewhat dogmatic basis. Usually, however, 
these projects also include plans to advance 11 the state of the art. 11 
To do this, background or basic research often must be done in fields 
not specifically related to the contract requirements but from which 
technical information will be derived of ultimate benefit to the equipment 
design and function. Funds spent for this type of research show no 
immediate tangible results and often, for a time, appear to be draining 
into a bottomless well until resultant valuable new principles or tech-
niques can be demonstrated. To budget an advance expenditure limit 
and measure progress against it for effort of this nature is an extremely 
difficult task which can be controlled by a project engineer only nominally. 
All of the above listed subjects represent influences at least 
partially beyond the control of engineering personnel and which, to 
varying degrees, tend to weaken the most precisely established budgetary 
structure of a research and development contract. 
5. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Few people in managerial positions will deny the advantages 
to be gained from a. soundly conceived budget used as a bench mark 
against which to measure progress. Conversely, the disadvantages 
which may occur by improper use of the budget are also significant. 
A management engineer reporting on the application of 
budgetary principles to research and development work comments as 
follows: 
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Assuming that the cost estimate is capable of being 
met, the best insurance for staying within it is to 
budget it over the weeks or months planned for the 
project and constantly to compare the accumulating 
actual costs to the budget. This assures early knowl-
edge if costs are going to exceed the original estimate, 
in which case a revised estimate can be prepared and 
decisions ta:<en as to whether the project should be 
continued, thus avoiding the 11 throwing of good money 
after bad. 11 * 
A basic obstacle to this theory which continually arises to 
trouble project supervisors, however, stems from the fact that actual 
costs are of use as a comparison with budgeted costs only if these costs 
can also be simultaneously related to technical progress data. The 
receipt of an accounting schedule reporting that sixty percent of the 
funds budgeted for a given project are expended means, in itself, 
nothing. What is needed to give significance to these figures is infor-
mation showing that sixty percent of budgeted funds have been spent 
to achieve a given percent of work completion. Without this, the actual 
costs do not measure progress at all but simply measure the original 
estimate of the difficulty of the problem. Accurate information on the 
percentage of development work remaining to be done in order to com-
plete a contract is difficult to obtain because of the unfailing optimism 
of the research engineer. The solution to the chief stumbling block 
always lies around the corner. From the writer's observations, it 
appears that sixty percent of a research and development contract's 
funds goes to complete the last twenty percent of the development work. 
While a capacity for enthusiasm is a prime requisite for successful 
*16 
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work in the research and development field, it is often also a cause for 
understated cost estimates. 
Even where it is possible to compute what appears to be a 
sound appraisal of the percentage of work remaining to be done on the 
project, there is no simple way to convert this appraisal into accurate 
fiscal terms. Unfortunately, no guaranteed direct correlation exists 
between dollars expended and results obtained in research projects. 
It is frequently stated that the chief advantage of task or 
component budgets lies in the useful cost information obtained, not for 
present, but for future contract bidding.# In some cases, valuable 
cost data can be obtained from task expenditure information. More 
often, though, the value of actual contract cost data may actually be 
obscured rather than clarified by too ambitious a contract cost break·· 
down budget since the more detailed the breakdown, the more arbitrary 
the labor charge allocation becomes at the general engineering level. 
A universal human trait which comes into play when a 
research and development project is restricted empirically by lot, 
task, or project budget fiscal limitations to the point where technical 
research flexibility is disrupted is the tendency to "beat the system." 
The development engineer, project supervisor, department or labora .. 
tory manager, by judicious allocation of general experimental labor 
and material charges and a slightly flexible definition of "direct" vs 
11 indirect" costs usually can artificially assist in the collection of 
expenditures within the proper financial allotment area of the contract 
#2, pp. 103-104 
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or contracts. Research personnel defend their resorting to subterfuge 
such as this on the ground it represents the quickest, most efficient, 
and most economical way to get necessary work done for the Government. 
If this were not done the progress of various projects would be frequently 
slowed down or stopped with large and expensive staffs marking time 
while the technical provisions and financial appropriations were rear-
ranged in proper balance by involved contract negotiation. This pro-
cedure, while it may be justifiable as an operating necessity, again 
serves to make the various budgets established for each contract lot 
and the costs accrued against them somewhat unreliable for future 
bidding information purposes. 
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VII. Profit Aspects of Research and Development 
The subject of a proper rate of profit for research and 
,development work being performed under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts 
has long been a controversial issue in Government-industry circles. 
Members of Congress have frequently expressed unfavorable reaction 
to the use of CPFF contracts bearing "lush" profits and no risks. 
Representatives of industry, on the other hand, consistently maintain 
that the profit incentive on CPFF research and development work is 
totally inadequate for the importance, complexity, and risks of the 
assignments. 
As in most controversial subjects, the suspicion exists that 
a certain amount of validity may be found in the beliefs of each side. 
This chapter will discuss some of these beliefs. 
A. Government Viewpoint ~Profit 
The Government viewpoint on profit as expressed in connec-
tion with contract negotiation is that a proper profit allowance may be 
determined through consideration of three basic elements. These 
elements are (a) capital investment, (b) extent of risk, (c) required 
management ability. There are several other considerations involved 
but these, in the opinion of Government contract administrators, all 
constitute variations of the three fundamental factors. 
1. Profit Determination Factors 
a. Capital Investment 
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The Government is interested in the capital employed, how 
much of the company's own money is invested in the plant, how much 
federal financing is utilized, and to what extent Government facilities 
are furnished. In this connection, the character of the business must 
be considered, since much less capital is required in some industries 
than in others in relation to sales. Where heavy use is made of 
Government capital, contracting sources feel that profit margins should 
be lowered. 
b. Management Ability 
How complex is the item being produced and how much 
technical and management know-how is required? What is the company 
past performance record in regard to costs, technical achievements, 
deliveries, and quality? What has been the company contribution to 
the national defense in the way of developmental accomplishments? 
c. Extent of Risks 
How much risk is involved for the company in taking the 
contract? This is probably the key item in the entire question of 
profit on CPFF contracts. The Government position is that because 
all allowable costs are guaranteed, the contractor assumes no normal 
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commercial risk. Since risk and rate of profit in industry vary directly, 
the absence of risk means that the contractor should, in essence, be 
paid a profit only for professional and managerial services. 
After an evaluation of these items, the Government contract-
ing officer forms his conclusion as to the proper rate of return to be 
allowed the contractor for his effort. 
2. Contractor Comment 
In the case of CPFF research and development work, several 
adjustments have to be made to the above profit formula for it to be 
used successfully in the electronics field. 
The tremendous investment necessary for plant, equipment, 
and test facilities for research in the electronics industry, particularly 
activities related to aircraft, guided missile, or radar programs, 
requires almost every contractor to make heavy use of external sources 
of capital. Since interest on borrowed capital does not constitute an 
allowable cost in Government CPFF contracts, it effectively makes no 
difference to the Government whether the contractor uses his own or 
borrowed capital. The cost of any loan must come out of the contractor's 
final profit and there is some occasion for doubt as to whether the net 
profit return before interest exceeds by very much the interest charge. 
With regard to the use of Government capital, either in the 
form of plant facilities or tooling, the indefinite and non-commercial 
nature of electronic research and development contracts makes most 
companies refuse to incur large fixed charge obligations for the relatively 
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low profits received in return. The electronics industry, almost as 
a matter of policy, follows the practice of requesting Government 
assistance where research program demands necessitate heavy short-
term capital investments beyond the level which can be justified by 
normal company growth. Where this pattern is industry wide and where 
facility or tooling requirements will fluctuate with the type, size, and 
scope of each research project, there seems to be little point in attempt-
ing to establish profit gradations based upon this variable factor. 
The technical and managerial ability of a research and 
development company is scrutinized very carefully prior to the award 
of the contract. The company past performance record must be sa tis-
factory in order to receive consideration for the project award. Within 
this boundary, the matter of a proper profit is to some extent se~f­
compensating in that the completion of a contract within the maximum 
cost limitation insures the contractor a full profit return while the 
incurrence of overruns automatically acts to reduce the final profit 
percentage. 
The risk factor, or lack of it, is also common to all com-
panies in the research and development field since all experience the 
same set of financial reimbursement conditions under the CPFF con-
tract structure. Where the Government maintains that the research 
organization is completely absolved frrun all risks by the CPFF contract 
provisions, the contractor argues that, in fact, he assumes many types 
of risks in performing research and development work. This point 
will be considered further in the following section. 
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Because of these complicating facts, the normal indices used 
to measure allowable rate of profit on Government contracts seem to 
break down in certain respects when applied to CPFF work. The ques-
tion becomes not so much one of discovering profit ratios applicable to 
specific contracts or contractors as that of establishing profit principles 
suitable for over-all contract negotiation in the research and development 
field. 
B. Contractor Viewpoint on Profit 
The typical industrial contractor considers research and 
development work a desirable but relatively low profit operation. It 
is desirable from the standpoint that it opens the best, and in some 
cases only, avenue through which profit-making production contracts 
may ultimately be received, Development activities in themselves 
cannot, however, in most contractors' opinion, be considered a signifi-
cant company profit-maker. 
Research and development contracts in the electronic indus-
try generally pay a profit, or fee, ranging between 6 and 7. 5 percent 
of original estimated cost, the average, in the writer's experience 
being about 7 percent. 
Out of this profit ratio, must come any percentage reductions 
created by contract overruns. A conservative estimate of the influence 
of this event would require a reduction in the average profit rate from 
7 percent to 6 percent. 
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This assumes that there are no unallowed costs in the com-
pany expense structure acting to reduce further this rate. Actually 
there are many such unallowable costs which must come out of profit. 
Again, a conservative appraisal of the effect of these items would lower 
the net profit rate by at least 2. 5 percent. Applying these correction 
factors, the contractor's net profit is reduced to something approximating 
3. 5 percent of costs before taxes. 
In contrast to these figures, the research contractor points 
to available Renegotiation Board statistics on production contracts. 
The average profit on defense production sales runs from 10 to 14 per-
cent of costs. 
The normal production contract involves the determination 
and establishment of assembly methods necessary to turn out a quan-
tity of items according to a furnished set of drawings and specifications. 
A working unit is in existence, models are usually available, and the 
issues are basically those of production techniques and equipment 
11 debugging. 11 This, of course, over-simplifies the subject, particularly 
where extensive production engineering redesign is necessary to convert 
a developmental unit into a production equipment. However, the diffi-
culties are generally capable of being solved in a straightforward manner. 
On the other hand, the research and development contract 
presents a challenge of the highest order. It is filled with unknown 
problems which tax the abilities of the best scientists and engineers 
in the field. Yet the Armed services consider this type of effort to be 
worth only one third of the profit received for production work. 
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The distinction between electronic production and research 
and development contracts from a profit treatment standpoint is really 
a result of the difference in contractual form. A maximum price con-
tract is the general rule for production orders, safeguarded somewhat 
usually by a price redetermination clause. The contractor assumes 
the risks of making a winning bid on the work, manufacturing the equip-
ment within the bid price, and sinking his own funds into the program 
without payment until equipment delivery. As a matter of fact, however, 
the final contract price may not be definitely established until well 
along in the production run - perhaps at 25 percent completion, a point 
where the contractor should have a fairly clear knowledge of costs. 
The almost universal industrial use of progress payments in large 
scale production contracts means that the Government is financing 
75 percent of production inventory costs prior to equipment completion. 
In comparison, the CPFF contract is considered by Government 
agencies as bearing no risk, thus deserving a relatively small profit. 
It is interesting to read a management engineer's reply to this "no-
risk" argument: 
The first risk is that he (the contractor) will not 
recover the cost of investigating the problem before 
he bids on the contract. Maybe he can't find, maybe 
there is no practical way. Then comes the risk of 
failure. There is no guaranty that the device will 
work, or it would be a production contract. A few 
such failures, and the contractor's reputation for 
excellence in research, which is often his most 
valuable possession, vanishes. 
The contractor obtains the contract, and puts the 
best technician available in charge of it, that is, 
the best technician in that particular field. There 
are so many fields, many of them so new, that the 
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supply of technicians in any one field is very limited. 
A superb engineer may_ know next to nothing of elec • 
tricity; a fine electrical engineer may know little 
of electronics; and an outstanding electronic engineer 
doesn't know too much about the magnetron, the radar 
generator. 
Then the contractor takes the risk that his technicians 
will not discover secrets that nobody has been able 
to find out; that his best men will be laid up by illness 
or accident; that competitors will offer them better 
jobs. 
Now comes the risk of overrun, wherein the agreed 
price is consumed in costs before final results are 
achieved. It is sometimes supposed that the con-
tractor suffers no loss if he stops work when the 
money runs out. But can it reasonably be said that it 
costs nothing when a business is disrupted, when work 
plans are suspended and morale approaches zero? The 
construction engineer and the production engineer have 
no means of knowing the gloom of the research engineer 
during overruns; it is like dying a little. * 
Risks, other than those already quoted, include: 
(a) The ever-present possibility of cut-backs and cancella-
tions. A change in Government requirements, reduction in appropria-
tions, or the success of a competitive program can quickly result in 
a research and development contract termination, leaving the contractor 
facing work stoppage, employee lay-offs, (costly from a public relations 
standpoint and increasing materially the difficulty of hiring desirable 
personnel later), unused plant and equipment facilities, and long and 
involved termination procedures. 
(b) The loss of economic stability suffered by an company 
devoting an important share of its efforts to Government research and 
development programs, Upon completion of contract requirements, 
*13, pp. 227-238 
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unless immediate supplementary or replacement work can be found, 
the concern must overcome a serious problem of sales volume. In 
recognition of this fact, most companies engaged in large -scale research 
and development are constantly striving to increase their ratio of com-
mercial work to Government work in order to achieve better business 
balance. Some companies, as a matter of policy, restrict Government 
activities to a stipulated percentage of total capacity to limit this risk 
of over-dependency on Government contracts. 
In addition to the question of comparative risks, it may be 
mentioned that research and development contracts absorb the finest 
technical talents of a company, talents which could well. be assigned 
to more profitable company business, either for the military or com-
mercial market. From the viewpoint of financial support, research 
and development programs demand more both plant space and capital 
equipment per sales dollar than do production operations because of 
their diversified and special purpose requirements. 
On the basis of these statements, it is evident that the 
research contractor does not believe that his net profits are particularly 
"lush" or even adequate. Although some companies specialize exclu-
sively in research and development work many more are constantly 
trying to break into production work, .using their research and develop-
ment activities as (1) a prestige factor which will add to the company 
reputation and thus help in the receipt of production contracts, (2) a 
sponsored source of technical know-how which will enable them to 
maintain a leading competitive position in their field, and {3) a source 
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of future production orders resulting from successfu. operation of 
equipment which they have developed. 
C. Original Contract~ Net Contract Fee Percentage 
As has been stated, there is usually a significant change 
between the percentage of the original contract awarded as fee and the 
final percentage received by the contractor. This change is primarily 
created by two influences: 
1. Overruns 
Contract overruns are very common in research organiza-
tions. To the best of the writer's knowledge, large scale research and 
development programs which have been active over several fiscal years 
without occurring at least one overrun are in the distinct minority. To 
a large, perhaps overwhelming extent, over -expenditures are a product 
of the modern research system in this country and cannot be avoided 
completely, although effective planning and management can help mini-
mize their incidence. Because overruns vary appreciably between 
contracts and companies, it is impossible to make generalized estimates 
of their depressing effect on profit with any degree of reliability ; how-
ever, an average of 10 to 20 percent of profit appears to be a reasonable 
guess. In the electronics company under general consideration a ten 
year average of contract profits shows a fee reduction of 15 percent 
due to overruns. 
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2. Unallowable Costs 
The subject of unallowable costs is one of the chief areas of 
contractual disagreement between representatives of the Government 
and industry. A successful contractor competing in a commercial mar-
ket is extremely conscious of the costs of doing business and exerts 
all possible effort to reduce these costs to a minimum. It is difficult 
for him to understand a concept which segregates these necessary 
operating costs into allowable and unallowable categories. 
a. Costs Not Necessary for Performance of Government Contracts 
Into this category fall such items as sales commissions, 
advertising expenses, and bad debt reserves. The Government view-
point is that such costs do not apply to Government contracts. They 
represent costs pertaining exclusively to commercial business and 
must be excluded in calculating a selling expense base applicable to 
Government contracts. The company need pay no sales commison or 
advertising charges to secure Government contracts since the Government 
itself seeks out potential sources of supply or publicly announces bids, 
Also, as the Government does not default on its proper debts, no bad 
debt reserve can be allowed to be established for Government contracts. 
b. Entertainment 
Since Federal Government personnel are forbidden by regula-
tion to accept contractor entertainment, this item is not includable in an 
overhead base to be applied against Government contracts. 
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c. Contingency Reserves 
This type of charge is considered unaliowable because it 
represents a claim for reimbursement for an item which has not and 
may never be incurred. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts honor o.e1ly actual 
costs incurred in work performance. 
d. Contributions and Donations 
If the Government reimburses the contractor for contributions 
made, then the Government not the company is making the contribution. 
Following this reasoning, donations should come out of profits rather 
than costs. 
e. Federal Income Taxes 
This item is excluded as a cost on the theory that inclusion 
of such charges in the rate base would be equivalent to the Government 
paying taxes to itself. 
f. General Research 
The Government states that it reimburses the contractor 
directly for all research costs incident to military contracts. Any other 
research costs are considered to be related to commercial business, 
either present or future. Where companies claim that the Government 
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has derived considerable benefits as a result of their research activity, 
and should therefore support a portion of it through the overhead base, 
the counter argument is advanced that the attainment of this know-how 
is the reason for the existing contract award. 
g. Interest on Debt 
This is a most important cost to the average company. The 
Government philosophy covering this item is that the contract profit or 
fee is intended to provide for a return on capital investment. The 
Government cannot be concerned about whose capital is employed to 
secure this return. It may be provided by internal company investment 
or by external sources such as banks or insurance companies. Having 
established that a profit on investment has been paid the Government 
will not make duplicate payment through reimbursement of interest 
costs on borrowings. This would have the additional effect of a special 
subsidy for poorly financed companies taking Government contracts. 
The above listed unallowable costs constitute the significant 
items affecting profits on Government contracts. For a more detailed 
discussion of the pros and cons of this general subject, the reader is 
referred to Paul M. Trueger's Accounting Guide for Defense Contracts. 
Much of the background material for this section has been drawn from 
this source. 
Again, while there are, to the writer's knowledge, no pub-
lished statistics industry-wide on the effect of unallowable costs, based 
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on one electronics company's experience, one might estimate a profit 
shrinkage of 2 to 3 percent of costs. 
The final profit on a CPFF contract bearing a 7 percent 
negotiated fee may then dwindle to a figure closer to 3. 5 or 4 percent 
before taxes. Comparing this percentage return with the magnitude 
of the problems faced, it may be seen why the research contractor 
does not feel overpaid. 
D. Renegotiation Aspects 
All Government contracts with industrial contractors are 
normally subject to the Renegotiation Act of 1951. This act is intended 
to eliminate excess profits on Government contracts by providing for 
an annual over-all review of the profits of every defense contractor 
holding Government contracts in excess of $500, 000. It, in effect, 
gives the Government a recapture right to all profits deemed excessive 
by the Renegotiation Board. The total company annual profit on its 
Government fixed price business is considered, for renegotiation 
purposes, as one ratio, as is its total profit on CPFF business. 
While the determination, under standard renegotiation factors, 
of any possible excessive profits is mainly applicable to fixed price 
production contracts, the same fundamental principles are applied to 
CPFF contracts. Profits in excess of original negotiated rates can 
arise from two situations in research work. 
First, by completing the contract requirements without 
spending all of the appropriated costs, the contractor increases his 
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rate of profit. Assuming a $100, 000 contract with a fixed fee of 
$7000 is completed after expending $80, 000 of costs, the fee becomes 
a ratio of $7000 on an $80, 000 base for a profit of 8. 8 percent instead 
of the 7 percent originally established by the contract. Situations of 
this type are few and far between in research and development, since 
most projects, if fortunate enough to be completed within the original 
cost estimate, are finished in a dead heat with contract fund exhaustion. 
Those few contracts which do finish up with the unused funds are subject 
to scrutiny by the Renegotiation Board as to the propriety of the earned 
fee. 
The second situation arises under contracts using negotiated 
instead of actual overhead rates to charge off indirect costs. Under 
this system, it is possible, over a single negotiation period to make 
a "profit" on overhead rate variance. Assuming a company using a 
negotiated overhead rate of 100 percent in a period where it is expe-
riencing a 90 percent actual indirect cost, there would be in the current 
negotiation period a I 0 percent favorable overhead spread, making for 
a temporary artificial overhead rate "profit." This variance would 
be corrected, of course, in the succeeding rate period by a reduction 
of the negotiated rate. Over a period of time, the two rates have to 
match closely since the negotiated is based on the actual. For any 
given rate period, however, there can be a noticeable difference creating 
artificial "profits" or "losses. " These variances are also subject 
to review by the Renegotiation Board and where they result in excessive 
profits, even though of a bookkeeping rather than operating nature, 
may be recaptured. 
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While the renegotiation feature of research and development 
contracts is relatively a side issue, because of the low net fees earned 
in this work, it does act as a cautioning influence on management to 
make sure negotiated overhead rates do not deviate too far from actual 
ones. 
E. Long -Run vs Short-Run Considerations 
Up to this point, discussions regarding the profitability of 
research and development work have emphasized the direct short-term 
aspects. However, there are two profit incentives of an indirect long-
term classification which play important parts in influencing industrial 
organizations to actively seek Government research and development 
contracts. These influences are (1) the achievement of technical 
know-how resulting from research and development activities and 
(2) the possibility of production contracts emanating from the develop-
ment of successful experimental equipment. 
1. Achievement of Technical Know-How 
A major Government contention in favor of a low profit or 
fee rate on research and development work is that the contractor 
receives, in addition to monetary profit, a bonus in the form of valu-
able technical know-how achieved at Government expense in the per-
formance of the contract. This must be recognized as a valid point. 
Although much of the know-how derived has no commercial application. 
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many of the new techniques created are of considerable industrial value. 
The contractor, under usual contract provisions, also possesses a pro-
prietory right to all basic discoveries or inventions made under the 
contract -i.e., he may patent any such items. In return, the Government, 
under this contract clause, receives an exclusive, royalty-free license 
to the invention. It almost goes without saying that this privilege repre-
sents a highly desirable feature to a company engaged in the embryonic 
areas of modern electronics. 
2. Subsequent Production Contracts 
Until the last year or so, it could safely be stated that an 
important factor influencing electronic companies to undertake Govern-
ment research and development contracts was the competitive advantage 
thus obtained in the bidding for subsequent production orders. It was 
held that the experience gained in the design and fabrication of a proto-
type model plus the availability of an experienced development staff for 
production engineering assistance gave the developing contractor a 
sizable technical and cost advantage over competition. 
Recent events in the electronics industry, however, have 
changed production award factors to the point where many industrial 
representatives maintain that the developing contractor now holds no 
appreciable advantage, indeed may even be at a disadvantage, in the 
open competition for production contracts. Two basic elements contri-
bute to this situation: 
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(1) Electronic manufacturers, during slack volume periods, 
may bid on the basis of partially recovering overhead costs through a 
below factory cost bid. Possession of realistic cost estimates may actu-
ally be a bidding disadvantage in such a case. 
(2) Companies holding Government profits due to be recaptured 
through renegotiation can deliberately underbid competition on desirable 
new business without penalty. Under present regulations, excess renege-
tiable profits on one contract may be offset by losses on another. 
Reasons why negotiation with the equipment developer on 
original production orders may be in the Government's interest are: 
1. Less time is lost because contract negotiation and produc-
tion planning can be integrated with the final stages of the development 
contract. 
2. The continuity of engineering supervision cuts down pro-
duction engineering training, resulting in time and meney savings. 
3. Since research and development work is not particularly 
profitable, contractors feel work incentive should be provided in the 
form of the first production award after completion of a successful 
development program. 
4. A developing contractor can often accomplish design 
improvements, even after the equipment is in production, because of 
his unified responsibility. 
In recognition of these factors, the Department of Defense 
has recently issued a policy directive which appears to re-establish, for 
initial production awards at least, the competitive advantage of qualified 
developing contractors. The contents and implications of this new 
directive are reviewed in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
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VIII. Contractor - Government Liaison 
The various aspects of research and development financing 
which have been discussed up to this point have been relo.'oively specific. 
Issues involving the relations between the contractor and the Government 
are perhaps more difficult to illustrate by concrete examples but are 
certainly of equal importance to the success of a program. 
A. Planning 
1. Long -Range Program Planning 
One area in which effective Contractor-Government liaison 
can yield large dividends is in the field of long range program planning. 
The steady movement of cognizant Government agencies toward £inane-
ing of research and development requirements on an annual rather than 
contract basis makes it imperative that work planning and budgeting be 
conducted by the two involved parties in a manner designed to correlate 
technical progress with financial support. This should permit the 
smooth continuation of effort from one contract phase to the next with 
no discouraging and expensive interruptions due to financial insolvency 
at a time when the need for additional funding could logically have been 
anticipated by several months. The program planning should not, how-
ever, be required to be conducted so far ahead of development progress 
as to lose any semblance of reality and become a mere exercise in 
statistical projection. It is somewhat frustrating for a contractor trying 
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to conduct a development program, still a year or two away from com-
pletion, through troubled financial waters on what appears to be a 
"shoestring" research and development budget, to receive Government 
requests for cost information on large scale production quantities of 
resultant equipment which cannot be made deliverable for three to five 
years. While the contractor is extremely pleased that his project is 
considered to be a prospective production requirement, he cannot help 
feeling some of this planning effort could more appropriately be channeled 
to the branch of the cognizant agency concerned with the program's 
more immediate research and development fiscal problems. 
Specifically, one of the major difficulties for a contractor 
working on a large program is the maintenance of operations in an 
intact fashion during the period from one contract year or phase to 
another while the responsible Government agency struggles with the 
approval, processing, and release of revised contract financial docu-
ments. A three-month processing interval for such documents is 
usually considered a minimum time cycle requirement while complex 
or high dollar value approvals frequently consume six months in review 
time. To this period should be added the preliminary unofficial talks 
between Government and contractor personnel before the submittal of 
formal paper work. This interval may be of several week's duration. 
It is significant to read the following comment on this general 
subject in an authoritative book written on our World War II jet engine 
development program. "The only way in which the serious delays 
involved in waiting for a formal contract before beginning each new 
step in a project could be avoided in the United States was by the investing 
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of private funds in sufficient extent to bridge the gaps between government 
contracts."* 
A decade later, it appears we are .striving to overcome the 
same set of conditions. 
It seems that the solution to this long-standing problem must 
come from two directions: (a) a continuing close collaboration between 
the project officer of the technical service and the contractor's repre-
sentatives in order to anticipate financing requirements sufficiently 
far in advance to permit thorough project review and exercise of orderly 
judgment, (b) closer co-ordination within the cognizant agency between 
the technical project personnel and contractual and financial sections. 
Too frequently, priority programs vigorously recommended by techni-
cal personnel stumble over what are essential contractual or legal fine 
points in the proposed agreement or amendment and are held up or 
returned for further "justification" to the program project officer. 
These internal delays, which may have very little to do with the con-
tractor directly, can result in a contractual document being bottled 
up within the sponsoring agency for lengthy periods which must be added 
to the required research and development time. 
B. Control 
In the preceding section, the writer discus sed the importance 
of proper program planning to insure adequate financial support of the 
*6, 1. 74 
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technical work. This is an essential point to be sure, but how does the 
sponsoring agency decide whether the present status and future prospects 
of the project make it worthy of continued support? This decision in 
involves another aspect of Government-Contractor liaison - the project 
control function. 
Direction of a project, at its outset, is established by the 
technical proposal and the contract resulting from it. However, this 
direction is not immutable and shifts in objectives and methods take 
place by necessity as the work progresses. How much flexibility of 
action and performance is an inherent part of research and development 
and at what point does this flexibility affect contractual relations to the 
degree that amendments are necessary? How is contract progress 
measured under these conditions? These questions are probably best 
answered by a consideration of the theory of project control. 
Most project officers in the military agencies who the writer 
has heard discuss this question of flexibility share the opinion that 
control of research and development work is best exercised on an over-
all basis. That is, the area of development and general objectives 
should be emphasized rather than the specific details. Control of the 
project is accomplished then by the general awareness of the project 
officer and agency technical staff as to what is going on. This awareness 
becomes the mechanism which is used to throttle or accelerate any 
specific phase of the work. Under this so-called "loose" control 
principle, the contractor is given a relatively free hand within the· 
general confines of prescribed development areas. 
• 
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A contract with the Government, however, in research and 
development as well as any other work, represents a legal commitment 
and as such is the product of a legal viewpoint. From experience, in 
order to protect Government interests, many standard safeguards are 
incorporated in such a document. Some of these safeguards are pri-
marily financial, such as detailed requirements for the physical sepa-
ration of contract material from all other material, contract lot cost 
segregation restrictions, and the necessity for notification of anticipated 
contract maximum cost expenditure. Others are technical in nature, 
calling out definite specifications and procedures which must be followed. 
While these restrictions and regulations are necessary for 
Government protection, it should be realized that what is being pur-
chased under a research and development contract is fundamentally 
an idea, managerial ability and technical competence. Too rigid an 
interpretation of the letter rather than the intent of the contract by 
persons far removed from the scene or too persistent attempts to 
guide research activities or finances down predetermined channels can 
only place barriers in the way of contractual progress. 
Industrial research and development is, almost by definition, 
inefficient. The process of theory and experiment is expensive; there 
is no way to put research on an assembly line basis. The primary 
problem is not how to do things efficiently but expeditiously since this 
ultimately is the cheapest way from a national security standpoint. 
Moreover, the greatest waste of Government funds is the project which 
eventually proves to be unsuccessful. At that point, all funds expended, 
no matter how well managed administratively, represent a complete 
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loss for immediate contract purposes and the question of close or 
loose control over program operations becomes largely academic. 
Professor Robert Schlaifer in his book, The Development of Aircraft 
Engines, makes the point that: 11 ••• the concern cautiously and slowly 
spending money on development might often equally as usefully have 
poured the money down a rat hole. While cautious and slow expenditures 
of corporate or public funds on development is often pure waste, lavish 
spending can be just as wasteful and both types of spending can freely 
mingle at the bottom of the rat hole. 11 * 
In the final evaluation we seem to return to the theme that 
what is generally being contracted for in this type of work is manage-
ment competence and technical know-how. Guidance, check-up, and 
evaluation of activity are necessary and desirable but attempts to exert 
too tight a control will probably defeat the purpose for which the control 
is established. 
C. Reporting 
1. Function of Technical Reports 
A standard requirement in all research and development 
contracts calls for the regular preparation of technical progress reports. 
These reports presented at period intervals (usually monthly or bimonthly) 
contain a fairly detailed account of what has been accomplished in the 
*6, p. 624 
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report period, summaries of major findings, appraisals of outstanding 
problems and obstacles which must be solved, results of tests, photo-
graphs of fabricated components, and usually a brief section on time 
schedules and financial balances. Information contained in these reports 
is used primarily for technical evaluation of the program and secondarily 
for distribution purposes to Government, industrial, and university 
organizations registered in the Armed Services Technical Information 
Agency (ASTIA) list so that classified technical research knowledge 
may be exchanged among organizations working on associated activities. 
These reports are not normally used for financial purposes. 
2. Function of Financial Reports 
The last few years have seen a steady increase in the number 
and variety of financial reports requested by the military agencies from 
the contractor performing CPFF work. The development of these forms 
(now normally specified in research and development contracts) has 
paralleled the trend to annual financing policies within the Defense 
Department. While the report period covered and extent of cost detail 
information requested vary among reports, all contain as a base the 
following data: 
I. Expenditures through the report period. 
2. Commitments through the report period. 
3. Remaining funds available for continued effort (unspent 
and uncommitted) by fi:scal year appropriation. 
4. Estimated monthly expenditure rate through the current 
fiscal year. 
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5. Estimated additional funds required in present fiscal year. 
6. Estimated completion date. 
7. Estimated funds required to complete work (including 
item 5). 
Prompt and effective use of this information can be an 
important factor in keeping contract effort on a sound financial basis. 
Although the contractor is not able in all cases to supply complete 
answers to these questions, (items 6 and 7 are often indefinite in annu-
ally financed basic research contracts) this type of report can be very 
useful for short term (current fiscal year) planning since it may pre-
sent the first indication of impending trouble. 
Fiscal reports are of aid, however, only if they can be 
received by the responsible agency on a current basis (within thirty 
days after end of report period). As discussed previously, the exten-
sive detail involved in CPFF accounting makes official company records 
unavailable in some companies for almost this period of time. These 
records must then be further broken down, for purposes of some reports, 
into collections of man-hours expended by types of labor, internal and 
external fabrication costs, factory and tooling overheads applied etc. 
to the point where they lose completely their current value. 
To perform their function most effectively, these reports 
must be simple and up-to-date. Where company procedures do not 
permit compilation of data on contract costs promptly it is the writer's 
opinion that current estimates would be more useful than delayed official 
statistics. 
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D. Monitoring 
1. Function of the Project Officer 
Upon the start of a project, responsibility for representing 
the sponsoring agency in its official relationships with the contractor 
is normally assigned to a specific individualwithin the appropriate 
technical section. This person, who may be either a military officer 
or civilian, is designated as project officer and becomes a key figure 
in the direction of the contract to a successful conclusion. 
The duties of this position demand a combination of abilities -
sufficient technical background to monitor and evaluate the work progress 
and understand its requirements; sufficient administrative talent to 
keep the project running smoothly, contractually and financially. In 
addition to these functions, the project officer becomes, after a while, 
identified with the contract in the eyes of the agency and may be called 
upon to defend its continuation or recommend changes or termination. 
Because he fills these needs, a qualified project officer can 
prove to be as valuable to the success of the program as a supervisory 
engineer. There is, however, a shortage of such men in the Government 
agencies competent to supervise these important programs. 
One of the major topics of investigation in the 1954 Congressional 
Hearings of the Committee on Government Operations on Organization 
and Administration of the Military Research and Development Progra1ns 
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centered about this point.# Some of the reasons advanced there in 
explanation of the existence of this condition within the military depart-
ments included: inadequate tours of duty by qualified technical officers 
because of Department of Defense rotation regulations, the tendency of 
officers to avoid specialized technical duty because of the lack of pro-
motion possibilities equal to those available in general line activities, 
and the temptation to competent technical officers to resign as quickly 
as possible to take better paying positions in private industry. 
The same turnover problem exists in the case of civilian 
project officers within the various Government agencies. Civil service 
positions cannot, in general, match the competition of private industry 
for the employment of qualified technical personnel. 
2. Period of Assignment Considerations 
These matters are, of course, out of the hands of the civilian 
contractor. However, in a field where success is largely accomplished 
as a group effort carried out on a consistent, long-range basis, stability 
of personnel is a primary requisite. This applies to associated 
Government as well as contractor personnel. It is a definite setback, 
then, for a contractor who has been fortunate enough to enjoy harmonious 
relations with a project officer to the point where mutual understanding 
and respect for each other's position have been built up, to have this 
man reassigned, possibly at a critical period in the equipment develop-
n1cnt or acceptance testing stage, and see his position taken by an 
#20, pp. 34-36 
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officer with no background knowledge of the project, perhaps limited 
technical experience, and a desire to flex his supervisory muscles. 
Occasionally, it must be admitted, the situation is reversed 
and the contractor heaves a sigh of relief as he bids farewell to a par-
ticular project officer considered to operate exclusively "by the book" 
at the expense of sound judgment. 
In general, though, the extreme complexity and many sided 
facets of a large scale research and development program make it 
highly desirable for the project officer to serve a long enough tour of duty 
to permit the most effective utilization of his experience with the program. 
In the Congressional hearing previously cited, testimony of scientific 
and military personnel favored a 4-year duty tour for military officers 
in technical assignments. The benefits gained in such a period prove 
especially valuable in connection with two potential sources of difficulty. 
First, although funding for most research and development is now on an 
annual basis, some progress toward the stability so desired by industry 
can be achieved by the joint efforts of the contractor and an experienced 
project officer familiar with both needs of the program and the availability 
of funds within the cognizant agency. Secondly, although it is a standing 
Government regulation that no project commitments or agreements have 
any validity until they are formally confirmed in writing, in research 
and development practice it seems impossible to escape completely tl:e 
informal agreements and contractual interpretations that take place 
between contractor and Government personnel in order to speed develop-
ment progress. Upon change -over of project personnel, in the middle 
of a contract, the possibility always exists of a dispute arising over 
meanings or interpretations previously believed resolved. 
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E. Technical Evaluation~ the Program 
1. Measurement of Contractor Performance 
A continuing objective of Government-Contractor liaison is 
the obtaining of information which will permit a factual measurement 
of contractor performance. At first glance, this appears to be a rela-
tively simple and straightforward task. Actually, it may prove quite 
difficult in many research and development programs. 
To begin with, the efforts of a research contractor are, for 
some time after start of work, largely theoretical. Preliminary 
feasibility studies and design calculations are based on available tech-
nical data projected and extrapolated for new configurations and adap-
tions, plus improvements, modifications and inventions made on the 
basis of engineering logic and experience. Evaluation of the project 
to this point can consist only of detailed analysis of the engineering 
approach and a general impression of the over-all competency of the 
contractor's staff. If the contractor's original recommended technical 
approach is assumed to be sound (and it evidently was so considered by 
virtue of contract award). agreement or disagreement with contractor 
planning must be mainly made on an equally theoretical basis. 
It is not until the construction and test of various pieces of 
"breadboard" circuitry that concrete evidence begins to appear to prove 
or disprove engineering theories. Breadboards are defined by Govern-
ment specification as "an assembly of preliminary circuits and parts 
to prove the feasibility of a device, circuit, equipment, system, or 
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principle in rough form without regard to the over -all design or form 
of parts. " This evidence must be viewed as preliminary, subject to 
the modifications of trial and error, and evaluated in the light of such 
factors as: how much progress has been made here in advancing the 
art, how great is the potential use of the equipment, and what are the 
accomplishments of competitive projects. 
By the time substantial factual data is available on perform-
ance capabilities of the equipment, equally substantial funds have usually 
been committed to the project by the sponsoring agency. 
Since this condition exists, the contractor faces the necessity 
of constantly "selling" the equipment to the project sponsor until such 
time as the equipment can sell itself. The ever-present threat of a 
project cancellation due to loss of interest or faith on the part of agency 
technical personnel makes this selling function an important part of 
Government-Contractor liaison. Sometimes, toward this purpose, it 
is necessary to sacrifice good financial management practices tempo-
rarily to secure technical approval. 
Even, after completion of the equipment development and 
demonstration of its operating characteristics, the agency must decide 
whether or not the contractor has shown "good performance." There 
is often no fundamental basis of comparison of contractor's efforts 
other than by this measurement. What is 11 good performance" ? If 
the contractor has not completely met the design objectives of the 
contract but the delivered equipment represents a step beyond that 
which competitive companies have been able to reach, has 11 good per-
formance" been achieved? The subleties of research and development 
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make this type of decision flexible and dependent to some degree on the 
working understandings, waivers, and agreements between the contractor 
and cognizant agency. 
All the above listed examples of Government-Contractor rela-
tions combine to make this aspect of research and development an 
important one from the standpoint of both technical and financial success. 
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IX. Summary and Conclusions 
The thesis has attempted to examine from a financial view-
point the management problems involved in performing military research 
and development contracts for agencies of the Department of Defense. 
Towards this end, emphasis has been placed on consideration of the 
factors directly affecting the financial position of the research contractor. 
These include the subjects of optimum contractual instrument form, 
contractor financing and cost reimbursement problems, working and 
fixed capital requirements, and stabilized program fiscal support. 
Profit aspects of research and development work have been discussed 
from both the contractor's and Government's standpoint, giving recog-
nition to direct and indirect profit implications. In addition, management 
operating problems and procedures having a direct bearing on the over-
all program fiscal status have been reviewed by the writer in respect 
to their contractual ramifications. 
Throughout the paper, as the title indicates, attention has 
been primarily directed to financial problems in their relationship to 
the individual contractor. Wherever the Government position on a 
current research and development fiscal issue is a matter of policy, 
record, or general industry knowledge, however, it has been reported 
in order to add to the scope of the discussion. 
In an effort to point up specific areas of difficulty, actual 
contract cases and experiences have been liberally used for backgrour,d 
information in the illustration of financial problems arising under 
characteristic research and development situations. Because of the 
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confidential nature of the data, from both a military security and company 
privacy point of view, the author has stressed the central point of each 
case rather than the details. 
The objectives of the paper have been twofold: (l) to outline 
the financial factors involved in electronic research and development 
work for the Government and (2) to suggest possible measures for 
eliminating difficulties in this field. 
It will be noted that the thesis is divided into four principal 
sections: (l) determining and contracting funds, (2) providing funds, 
(3) utilizing funds and (4) contractor rewards. 
For purposes of summary these sections will be considered 
in turn. While one of the basic conclusions reached as a result of this 
study is that there are many more unresolved pToblems and unsettled 
issues than ready answers available in this new complex field of activity, 
it nevertheless appears equally evident that certain general guiding 
principles exist which are worthy of serious consideration. 
A. Determining and Contracting Funds 
After a review of the uncertainties, both technical and finan-
cial, inherent in research and development work, it seems a safe con-
clusion that the present most feasible method of contracting for this 
activity is through the medium of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract negoti-
ated directly with the award winning company. This method does not 
mean that competition is eliminated but rather than consideration in 
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the form of an invitation to bid has been extended to all qualified sources, 
proposal data selectively reviewed, and negotiation carried out with 
several competitors, if advantageous to the Government. 
Although the above -mentioned procedure is conceded to be 
the best available system for research and development contract deter-
mination and award, it should not necessarily be accepted as the ideal 
long -range solution. There is need for improvement in several areas. 
Two definite sources of difficulty exist under present methods. 
(1) The first difficulty is the tendency of a sponsoring mili-
tary agency to fail to test fully the reasonableness of the quotation price 
when measuring competitive research and development bids. As previ-
ously noted, the only fixed charge in a CPFF proposal is the fee. This 
item constitutes a very small part (perhaps 7 percent) of the negotiated 
contract price. Published Government statistics on certain major 
research and development programs, studied by the writer, have shown 
variances between original estimated and final contract costs in excess 
of 100 percent. It can be seen therefore that it is very easy to attach 
too much weight to comparative CPFF bid estimates as a basis for 
award decision. Forced to compete under such circumstances, com-
panies seriously interested in receiving the job will price their bid on 
the basis of the presumptive intensity of the competition rather than the 
estimated complexity of the project. The desirability of the work because 
of technical know-how to be gained, large-scale equipment production 
potentialities, or unused company capacity which must be absorbed, 
provides adequate incentive to -cake certain contracts at an anticipated 
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low fee. The winning bidder relies on achieving sufficient technical 
progress and the project being of enough importance to induce the 
Government to sink in additional money when the original funds are 
expended. Such bidding practice is a hazard to both contractor and 
Government. From the contractor's standpoint it means that the con-
tract is on an unsound financial footing from the inception of activity 
and it is only a question of time until he must approach the contracting 
officer regarding more money. From the Government viewpoint it 
means that a company offering a sound technical approach and a realistic 
estimate of the over-all cost of the effort may have lost the award to 
a concern either unaware of the full complexity of the task, inexperienced 
in cost estimating, or willing to risk obtaining its costs piecemeal in 
the form of profit reducing overruns in order to receive this particular 
contract. Regardless of which factor creates the situation, the Govern-
ment suffers a loss. It loses if the company is not qualified technically 
to perform the assignment; it loses if the true costs of the contract 
must be paid for on an unplanned unforeseeable schedule and financed 
from appropriations originally intended for other purposes. Such bidding 
defeats the very objective of balanced operations which "pay as you 
go" funding is designed to achieve. 
There is no quick solution to this problem which will permit 
selection of the low qualified and realistic bid from the technically 
unqualified or deliberately understated proposal. "Final reliance must 
be placed upon the competence, information and honesty of the technical 
personnel within the services who designate the sources."* However, 
*4, p. 231 
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it would seem that an evaluation of the general reasonableness of quota-
tions from recognized research and development contractors could be 
aided by the gradual accumulation within the Government of pertinent 
data on past company cost estimating reliability. This information, ii 
used carefully, could provide a valuable "experience rating factor" 
index for all agencies to use in judging competitive bids. 
(2) The second present contractual weakness is the compara-
tively low incentive to efficiency provided by the CPFF structure. While 
it is generally agreed that research and development must be financed 
by a cost reimbursement contract, it is also recognized that this pro-
tection inevitably results in a tendency to ease up somewhat in the 
maintenance of a taut control of costs. The small difference in net fee 
(subject to renegotiation) earned by a research contractor holding the 
line closely on all controllable costs as compared to a management 
utilizing a less restrictive set of operating controls does not provide 
sufficient incentive to go "all out" in cost reduction programs. It is 
also highly questionable as to at what point the dollar savings effected 
by cost control drives are offset by lowered employee morale and a 
reduction in the general atmosphere most conducive to effective research. 
Very definite limits apply to the degree in which normal commercial 
concepts of full labor utilization, economic purchase quantities, and 
low overhead costs can be followed in a development laboratory. Witr,in 
these boundaries, however, contractual rewards should be established 
in a manner which will foster a greater consciousness of cost reduction 
benefits. Several different approaches to this objective have been 
discussed in contract negotiation circles -mainly centering about 
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savings -sharing plans or post contract evaluation for possible bonuses 
or fee increases as a result of superior performance. Such plans have 
never actually been actuated because of the obvious subjectivity and 
uncertainties with which they would have to be administered. This type 
of proposal, however, in the author's opinion, deserves continued study 
as a potential answer to this difficulty. 
B. Providing Funds 
The availability of adequate funds at the right time to ensure 
continuous technical progress from work start to finish is one of the 
fundamental concerns of research and development contract administra-
tion. Original program financial coverage may come partially in the 
form of a letter of intent, fully via a definitive CPFF contract, annually 
in the case of an installment contract, or provisionally by an anticipatory 
cost clause. Subsequent requirements may be met through contract 
amendments granting new scope or overrun funds. These methods, 
plus others mentioned in the thesis, constitute attempts to reconcile 
sound budgeting procedures with an adequate contract financing systen1. 
Cutting across the lines of individual contract situations and concentrating 
our attention on this goal, two points stand out: (I) the importance of 
proper timing in the fiscal support of research and development activity 
and (2) the necessity of stability of financial support in order to achieve 
steady long -term progress in this field. 
(I) Recent Government moves toward annual financing methods 
make the proper timing of fiscal support even more essential to project 
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success than was the case formerly. Correct timing can be aided ou 
the contractor's side by the establishment of reasonable expenditure 
rate budgets and the prompt comparison and control of actual costs 
against these budgets. While over-all contract performance costs are 
extremely difficult to estimate, the expenditure rate for a project group 
over a specific short period of time can usually be fairly accurately 
predicted since costs are then more of a function of time and group size 
than they are of development progress. A month by month measurement 
of actual costs with budgeted expenditures (on installment contracts 
particularly) will highlight significant variations early enough to permit 
corrective action - either by a planned expenditure stretch-out or prompt 
notification to the sponsoring agency of the state of events. Effective 
timing of financial assistance can be accomplished on the cognizant 
agency's part by an awareness of the current state of the program, 
technically and financially, a realization that weaknesses in project 
fiscal structure will be almost immediately reflected by a lag in tech-
nical progress, a realistic appraisal of the unavoidable inaccuracies of 
research and development ~stimating which will result in a sizable 
annual contingency reserve for the requirements of overruns and new 
scope, and timely contractual action on these requirements when they 
are justified. 
(2) Modern electronic research and development work, in 
addition to possessing a lengthy product delivery time cycle (a mini-
mum of two years for most major effort), is also highly specialized. 
Fiscal difficulties are thus accentuated. If the "state of the art" is to 
advance uninterruptedly it becomes necessary for a contractor to know, 
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not only that certain specific projects will be supported over a period 
of years to completion, but also that sufficient new work will be author-
ized to permit the full utilization of the particular skills of his staff. 
Because of the time required to organize and mold the diversified talents 
used in research and development into an effective integrated team, 
such assurances are essential. There is rarely opportunity to transfer 
these specialists to other work (assuming it is available) when particular 
research and development activities slacken and then recall them when 
new Government needs arise. A research and development laboratory 
differs sharply from a production function in that a reduction in staff 
and operations cannot be quickly compensated for at a later date by an 
increase in volume of physical output. 
Government research and development planning must, there-
fore, take this element into consideration in the scheduling of continuing 
programs. Stability of long-term support should be stressed regardless 
of scwrt-term immediate prospects which may temporarily tend to 
minimize the importance of such work. 
C. Utilizing Funds 
The utilization of contract funds in a manner which will produce 
most effective results is primarily a responsibility of the individual 
contractor. Primarily but not exclusively, for the sponsoring mili-
tary agency influences the use of project finances in many ways. This 
influence may be applied directly through contract cost segregation 
requirements and time limitations on appropriation expendituree, or 
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indirectly through delayed new financial support resulting in undesired 
stretch-outs of program schedules. Always, of course, the cognizant 
service influences the technical direction of the work by its technical 
monitoring and review function. 
Assuming for the moment that these external factors do not 
exist and the contract is always fully financed, how then can the contrac-
tor utilize available funds most efficiently in large scale research and 
development work? The writer is of the opinion that research and 
development is best conducted by a soundly conceived technical approach 
carried out in a consistent fashion with the maximum flexibility compat-
ible with over-all project objectives. The question of flexibility is of 
the utmost importance since an important discovery changing the direc-
tion of a research program can be made completely unexpectedly. 
If this flexibility is to be achieved, project control on the 
part of the sponsoring technical department must be maintained on an 
over-all rather than detailed basis. The author has discussed this 
viewpoint previously in the chapter on Government-Contractor Liaison. 
Attempts to control sections and segments of a research and development 
contract through individual lot cost restrictions serve only to remove 
this flexibility and compound the problems of fiscal management. It 
is possible under such conditions for the contract to be an administra·· 
tive success but a technical failure. It is also possible for funds too 
fixed in their usage specifications to outlive their technical importance 
and become unavailable for the general purpose for which they were 
appropriated. 
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An administrative procedure employed by the contractor to 
help achieve effective fund utilization is the measurement and control 
of costs through the project budget. After considering the advantages 
and disadvantages of this mechanism in research and development work, 
it seems possible to set forth some general conclusions. 
The project budget is of definite value in administering a 
research and development contract. However, it should be considered 
as an estimate of the general magnitude of the work to be performed 
rather than as a fixed limit to the cost of the project. The many factors, 
both internal and external, militating against a "maximum ceiling" 
theory makes such a concept unrealistic and unworkable. 
The budget breakdown should be confined to broad avenues 
of effort which give general cost trends by area rather than being 
established by detailed responsibilities which gradually become mean-
ingless as the lines of task boundaries become diffused. 
The project budget should be flexible rather than immutably 
fixed so as to be capable of adjustment as the direction of the research 
program changes over the period of the contract. 
Projects which are basically developmental in nature can be 
budgeted and monitored in detail more successfully than those which 
are of a research type. This is because the requirements for a develop-
ment contract are more specific and concrete than those involving 
research activities. 
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D. Contractor Reward 
The subject of adequate contractor reward for research and 
development contract performance is not a simple topic because of the 
inescapable fact that the definition of a fair profit depends to a certain 
extent on whether one is paying or receiving it. 
Analyzing the question first statistically, it has been pointed 
out that net profits on this type of work in the electronics industry tend 
to average around 3. 5 to 4 percent of costs. Out of this profit a company 
must pay taxes, dividends, and retain a percentage for reinvestment in 
the business. From this point of view, development work certainly 
does not appear as lucrative as production orders carrying a much higher 
return with less complex problems of performance. 
A conforming opinion is expressed thus by Professor Schlaifer:* 
Quite clearly a development contract, however liberal 
in its terms and its administration, is by itself no 
incentive to an established company: the real profits 
are made on quantity sales of a successful product, 
and the company will be really enthusiastic in its 
work only if it believes (1) that the project is tech-
nically sound, (2) that an adequate market will be 
found for the product, (3) that development of a new 
product will not lead to loss of greater profits on 
existing products. Without these beliefs a develop-
ment project is at best nothing but a nuisance in a 
first-rate firm, and in many cases is still worse 
because it diverts engineering facilities and manpower 
from other projects which the company does believe 
will lead to production and profits. 
The countering Government argument is that the two fields 
of activity are not comparable since research and development work 
*6, p. 64 
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carries no risk to the contractor and grants no guaranteed price ceiling 
to the sponsoring technical service while production work is performed 
on a predetermined maximum price basis. The writer has commented 
on this proposition in some detail in the chapter on Profit Aspects of 
Research and Development. 
Aside from the point of a justifiable percentage return for 
each of the two kinds of work, it is clear that, as a practical matter, 
production contracts offer greater profit possibilities to industry than 
does research and development work, and for this reason are in general 
more eagerly pursued by electronic companies. The production poten-
tial of a research and development bid invitation exerts considerably 
more incentive for a contractor to undertake project performance than 
does the fixed fee which ultimately may be expected from the contract. 
The development work itself actually represents an investment in the 
future. 
Recent occurrences in the field of contract negotiation indi-
cate that Government sources are giving increased consideration to the 
position of the industrial contractor with respect to research and devel-
opment profit margins. This attention is taking the form of: 
(l) pending new regulations broadening the area of CPFF 
allowable costs. Several items, formerly unallowable for cost recovEry 
purposes, are now to be reimbursable overhead charges. The cost of 
general research is probably the most important item to the average 
company in this classification change. This reduction in unallowable 
costs will, have the effect of increasing the contractor net yield. 
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(2) A new policy directive from the Department of Defense 
governing the award of initial production contracts for technical mili-
tary supplies following developmental contracts for such supplies.# 
While reaffirming the policy of the Department of Defense to make no 
commitments to research and development contractors regarding sub-
sequent production contracts, the directive states that it is frequently 
in the best interests of the Government that the initial production order 
be placed with the development contractor if he is qualified to do pro-
duction work. Where this is the case (the reasons leading to such a 
decision are reviewed in the section on Subsequent Production Contracts), 
price advantage along should not dictate the award to another bidder, 
unless a fair and reasonable price cannot be negotiated with the original 
developing source. This ruling increases the incentive to do a superior 
research and development job because of the likelihood of a following 
profitable production award. 
Financial management of a research and development pro-
gram, in the writer's opinion, consists essentially of the direction and 
control of the four functions summarized in this chapter. Any step 
taken by either the contractor or Government to improve fiscal or 
operating procedures or narrow areas of disagreement in these fields 
of responsibility will most certainly be reflected in more effective 
research and development work. 
#·Department of Defense Directive 4105.10 dated March 17, 1955 
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